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Abstract
The American creed of e pluribus unum—out of many, one—has proven to be an
elusive aspiration for societies throughout history. Research suggests that as the diversity
of a community increases, its stores of social capital decline. Yet, there exists a growing
body of evidence that suggests under certain conditions, patterns of inclusion and
collaboration are not only possible but predictable. This project explores theory on
effective communication practices, grounded in Habermas’s Theory of Communicative
Action, as well as research on effective group interaction to suggest that certain
communicative capacities and collaborative processes that successfully face the challenge
of e pluribus unum at the level of groups and organizations might also apply to broader
communities. After reviewing a series of case studies, a community learning model is
offered as a way to promote those conditions more intentionally under a broader “civic
canopy” as a way to help establish a new set of community norms—or a new civic
operating system—that regards civil society as a type of associational ecosystem that can
enable communities to better learn and adapt to the challenges they face.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The Challenge of Difference and Unity
In early July, 1776, when the members of the committee tasked with creating the
first “Great Seal” for the newborn United States of America convened to determine the
proper motto to capture the spirit of the nation, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and
Thomas Jefferson narrowly chose “E Pluribus Unum” over Jefferson’s suggestion of
“Rebellion to Tyrants is Obedience to God.” While both mottos might have spoken to
the challenge of their age, e pluribus unum has spoken to a challenge of all ages. Nearly
250 years later, we still struggle to live up to, and at times even understand, the full
meaning of the creed: out of many, one. In his 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture entitled
“E Pluribus Unum: Community and Diversity in the 21st Century,” Robert Putnam
captured the tensions inherent in the challenge of creating one from many. After
reviewing the data on social capital—“the norms and networks that enable communities
to act collectively” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000)—from over 30 communities around
the country, Putnam found that as the level of diversity in a community increases, the
level of social capital in the community declines (Putnam 2007). In fact, in diverse
communities people tend to withdraw not only from those different from themselves, but
even from their own kind. As Putnam puts it:
Inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to
distrust their neighbors, regardless of the color of their skin, to withdraw even
from close friends, to expect the worst from their community and its leaders, to
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volunteer less, give less to charity and work on community projects less often, to
register to vote less, to agitate for social reform more, but have less faith that they
can actually make a difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of the television.
Note that this pattern encompasses attitudes and behavior, bridging and bonding
social capital, public and private connections. Diversity, at least in the short run,
seems to bring out the turtle in all of us. (Putnam 2007, 151)
When one considers the fact that diversity in neighborhoods and workplaces is
rising with the trends in international migration patterns (Judy and D’Amico 1997),
Putnam’s findings suggest a significant unraveling of the social fabric on a broad scale.
While some take issue with Putnam’s particular conception of social capital and its
decline, even his detractors acknowledge the trends of fragmentation in our communities
in recent decades and agree that the realities of pluralism—the differing and sometimes
incompatible worldviews that have come into increasing contact as populations become
more diverse—pose challenges for our neighborhoods and our nation (Edwards and
Foley 2001a, 2001b; Sirianni and Friedland 2001; Blackshaw and Long 2005). Our
willingness and ability to gather as a public in town hall meetings, bowling leagues, or
civic associations has declined steadily over the past four decades and given way to more
individualized pursuits, and a corresponding tendency to outsource our civic
responsibilities to increasingly polarized political advocacy groups (Bellah 1985; Etzioni
1993; Dahl 1994; Snyder 1999).
But the search for unity amidst the realities of diversity is only one horn of the e
pluribus unum dilemma. However daunting it may be to achieve unity within the context
of diversity, respecting the diverse identities of minority cultures within a historically
dominant cultural mainstream has proven equally challenging. At the extremes, history is
replete with horrific lessons about the costs of conformity to a narrow notion of “us” that
disregards and then drives out difference. The Holocaust of Nazi Germany, the gulags of
2

the Soviet Union, the decimation of indigenous cultures in the Americas, and the killing
fields in Cambodia all stand as stark reminders of the cost of pursuing cultural uniformity
at the expense of honoring diversity. But even in less extreme forms, the legacy of
intolerance for difference can have deleterious effects that last generations (Takagi 1993;
Glauser 1999). The costs of this intolerance for difference are borne by both the
mainstream and the minority, for when people believe that their voice is not equally
valued, the likelihood that the group will succeed in its collective task is greatly
diminished (Hicks et al. 2008; Van Dijke, Cremer and Mayer 2010; Morrison and Von
Glinow 1990). In light of the challenges of promoting unity while still honoring
diversity, it is little wonder that history is easily characterized as a pendulum swinging
between efforts to promote unity and periods of resistance in the name of diversity
(Schlesinger 1998; Caravantes 2010; Leholm and Vlasin 2006).
Fortunately, between the rock of Putnam’s “turtle effect” and the hard place of
forced conformity, a growing body of research in a wide array of fields suggests that
rather than the constant pull between opposing forces of part and whole, self and
community, a more dialectical incorporation of those forces that unites individuals within
interdependent, collaborative networks is not only possible, but quite probable, under a
set of proper conditions. Specifically, this research suggests that the quality of
communication within a group, and the corresponding coordination of actions that
communication enables between individuals, organizations, and systems, correlates
directly with the effectiveness and stability of the group. By way of example, consider
these facts: researchers can predict within a matter of minutes, and with 94% accuracy,
which marriages will remain intact and which will be headed for divorce within three
3

years based on the couple’s perceptions of their relationship and their style of
communication (Gottman 1994); researchers found that the quality of the community
process that was used to adopt an evidence-based program across 16 sites was more than
twice as likely to explain the variation in outcomes than any set of individual factors of
the participants—four years after the program was selected by the communities (Hicks et
al, 2008); and the degree to which communities improve their schools, address poverty,
pass bonds, and resolve conflicts correlates almost directly with their levels of social
capital and sense of community (Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Putnam 2000; Solow
2000; Varshney 2000). In each of these cases, the critical ingredient is the pattern of
communication that enables the successful coordination of actions oriented toward
collective goals. Although our current conception of human systems borrows more from
industrial metaphors of mechanistic interaction, increasingly the most effective human
systems appear to work more like natural systems. In natural systems, diversity is not a
challenge to be solved but a source of strength and adaptability. I will argue that human
systems can and do thrive when the conditions for effective communication,
collaboration, and connection obtain. This project is an attempt to draw upon this
research to develop a new model for engaging communities in the process of building
healthier civic ecosystems that successfully overcome the challenges of e pluribus unum
in their relationships, institutions, and systems.
Cultural Crises and Cultural Operating Systems
To understand how humans wrestle with the twin challenges of e pluribus unum—
both conformity and fragmentation—is in many ways to understand the very process of
socialization itself: how the individual comes to internalize her culture and customs as
4

part of becoming a full, autonomous individual, and how she in turn learns to reinforce
them as a member of that group. In his foundational work The Sacred Canopy, Peter
Berger argues that this
Fundamental dialectical process of society consists of three moments, or steps.
These are externalization, objectivation, and internalization. . .It is through
externalization that society is a human product. It is through objectivation that
society becomes a reality sui generis. It is through internalization that man is a
product of society. (Berger 1990, 4)
Societies maintain cultural coherence over time through the collective
construction of a meaningful cultural and social order—what sociologists refer to as
nomos. Like tribal fires staving off the surrounding darkness of the unknown, our
socially constructed systems of meaning have historically provided the warmth and light
of collective psychological security and act as a defense against the existential anxiety of
our precarious fate in the universe. “The socially established nomos may thus be
understood, perhaps in its most important aspect, as a shield against terror” (Berger 1990,
22). Religious and cultural traditions ensure this nomos maintains integrity from
generation to generation through constructing and sharing meaning. As theologian Sheila
Davaney explains, “Culture is the process by which meaning is produced, contended for,
and continually renegotiated and the context in which individual and communal identities
are mediated and brought into being” (Davaney 2001). This continual contention and
negotiation typically amounts to minor revisions to the nomos rather than revolutions, but
over time, when the prevailing cultural assumptions are no longer adequate to the
meaning-making task, a crisis erupts and the society either treats it as a learning process
and adapts or as a dissolution process and collapses (Habermas 1973b). In contemporary
parlance, nomos acts like a type of cultural operating system, or a shared platform, that
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enables members of a cultural group to coordinate their social actions in a coherent and
effective manner. To extend the metaphor, when these operating systems become
overtaxed by the complexity of the demands of their users, they are “upgraded” to better
accommodate the particular demands of the age, or “crash” and the society dissolves into
its constituent elements. Because a thorough history of western societal evolution is well
beyond the scope of this project, I will overlook the more granular analysis of social
epochs and simply use the convention of pre-modern, modern, and postmodern
periodization in Western society to divide the phases of our cultural operating systems.
Specifically, borrowing from and adapting Berger’s lexicon, I will use the terms the
sacred canopy, the secular canopy, and the civic canopy to illustrate the broad outlines of
our societal evolution and to provide context for the major historical shift in how we
organize ourselves today.
COS 1.0: The Sacred Canopy
Our earliest shield of meanings projected onto the universe is what Berger calls
the sacred canopy—“the establishment of an integrated set of definitions of reality that
could serve as a common universe of meaning for the members of a society” (Berger
1990, 134). Religion serves as the legitimating force par excellence because “religion
implies that human order is projected into the totality of being. Put differently, religion is
the audacious attempt to conceive of the entire universe as being humanly significant”
(28). Given the precarious nature of all socially constructed systems of meaning, our
earliest cultural ancestors survived in large part because of the unifying power of a shared
system of beliefs over and against threats to that system—including nature, internal
conflict, and external threats from other tribes or cultural groups with different belief
6

systems (31). As these threats threatened to pull apart a given shared worldview, the
presumptive response of COS 1.0 was to opt for unity at the expense of diversity.
While COS 1.0 functioned more or less adequately through the Middle Ages as
societies maintained their organic whole even in the face of shifting empires, by the time
of the Reformation and the rise of the scientific revolution, the competing “plausibility
structures” tore at the taken-for-granted truths of the sacred canopy and produced a
“legitimation crisis” (Habermas 1973b), which forced COS 1.0 to have to compete for
legitimation in an atmosphere of increasing pluralism. No longer could the nomos of the
sacred canopy unconditionally bind cultures together, with a presumed unity of the
people. The tribal fires of nomos—delicate flickers ignited during a dangerous world of
superstition and magic—were sustained through the Middle Ages through traditions and
strong customs, but now faced forces that demanded justification and not simply faith.
Where COS 1.0 had used the strength of the unum to keep the pluribus at bay, the
demands of a more plural world would soon shift that balance forever.
COS 2.0: The Secular Canopy
While some describe the transition from pre-modern times to modernity as a
matter of “outgrowing” the belief systems of the past, that conceptualization misses the
point of the role of our cultural operating systems. Every society must construct its
collective reality in a way that has permanence, that provides meaning, and that conceals
its constructed nature by ascribing its truth to the actual nature of the universe itself. This
is no less true of the modern era than the pre-modern era. According to Berger,
In archaic societies, nomos appears as microcosmic reflection, the world of men
as expressing meanings inherent in the universe as such. In contemporary society,
this archaic cosmization of the social world is likely to take the form of
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‘scientific’ propositions about the nature of men rather than the nature of the
universe. Whatever the historical variations, the tendency is for the meanings of
the humanly constructed order to be projected onto the universe as such. (Berger
1990, 25)
The rise of scientific certainty in the justification of world views can be seen in
story of our nation’s founding period. Historian Gordon Wood’s account of the birth of
the United States in the period between the Revolution of 1776 to the ratification of the
Constitution in 1789 provides a window into the tremendous shift that occurred in the
mindset of the political age, what I would call the movement from COS 1.0 to COS 2.0 in
the United States. For the Revolutionaries, society was seen as an undifferentiated,
organic whole that was in the throes of resisting the tyranny of an unjust ruler. In the new
republic they were about to form, that unified society would be freed to orient itself
toward the collective good of the whole:
By 1776 the Revolution came to represent a final attempt, perhaps—given the
nature of American society—even a desperate attempt, by many Americans to
realize the traditional Commonwealth ideal of a corporate society, in which the
common good would be the only objective of government. (Wood 1972, 54)
This belief in a unified society did not mean the founders were not aware of the
threats of internal rivalry and conflict; indeed, they saw their enterprise of forging a new
nation as a balancing act between the twin dangers of absolute tyranny on one side and
absolute anarchy on the other side. Still, argues Wood,
Despite, or perhaps because of, the persistence of social incoherence and change
in the eighteenth century, Americans creating a new society could not conceive of
the state in any other terms than organic unity. . .The contracts, balancing
mechanisms, and individual rights so much talked of in 1776 were generally
regarded as defenses designed to protect a united people against their rulers and
not as devices intended to set off parts of the people against the majority. (59-60)
However, in the mere span of a decade, the belief in the essential unity of a people
freeing itself from the chains of its tyrant would change dramatically in the face of the
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complexities of actual governance. As the states framed their constitutions and found all
manners of governance to be in jeopardy, and as the Articles of Confederation quickly
proved incapable of binding the states together in a way that was adequate to the task, the
romantic notion of a unified people that characterized the Revolutionary spirit gave way
to the recognition that democracy had unleashed a new set of problems unforeseen when
constrained by tyranny. “’We have, probably,’ wrote Washington with emphasis, ‘had
too good an opinion of human nature in forming our confederation’” (472). To unify the
foundering states, and to check the vices of the people—the “ambition of the poor and the
avarice of the rich”—a national constitution, based on the enlightenment science of
government derived from the likes of Locke and Montesquieu, would need to be framed
that would provide a technical solution to the social problems of the age.
The result was an amazing display of confidence in constitutionalism, in the
efficacy of institutional devices for solving social and political problems.
Through the proper arrangement of new institutional structures the Federalists
aimed to turn the political and social developments that were weakening the place
of the ‘better sort of people’ in government back upon themselves and to make
these developments the very source of the perpetuation of the natural aristocracy’s
dominance of politics. Thus the Federalists did not directly reject democratic
politics as it had manifested itself in the 1780’s; rather they attempted to adjust to
this politics in order to control and mitigate its effects. (517)
In essence, what was needed to preserve the res publica, the good of the whole,
was to create a new mechanism for maintaining social order that neither relied on belief
in a common tradition nor on faith in the virtue of the people.
The eighteenth century had sought to understand politics, as it had all of life, by
capturing in an integrated, ordered, changeless ideal the totality and complexity of
the world—an ideal that the concept of mixed constitution and the proportioned
social hierarchy on which it rested perfectly expressed. . .By destroying this ideal
Americans placed a new emphasis on the piecemeal and the concrete in politics at
the expense of order and completeness. The Constitution represented both the
climax and the finale of the American Enlightenment, both the fulfillment and the
end of the belief that the endless variety and perplexity of society could be
9

reduced to a simple and harmonious system. By attempting to formulate a theory
of politics that would represent reality as it was, the Americans of 1787 shattered
the classical Whig world of 1776. (606)
In place of the shattered assumptions of 1776, Americans built a new operating
system that promised to use the power of enlightened rationality, rather than religious
unity, to curb the passions of the people in service of the greater good. Just as the
Copernican revolution de-centered the earth within a helio-centric universe,
Enlightenment rationality displaced religion’s presumptive seat at the center of society.
Weber’s thesis that Enlightenment rationality not only led to the “disenchantment of the
world,” but produced the twin titans of the bureaucratic state and market capitalism,
epitomizes the new nomos of the Enlightenment. While some dispute Weber’s particular
characterization of the secular (Stout 2004), it is clear that by the beginning of the 18th
century, a secular canopy had been established as the new COS 2.0. However, where the
sacred canopy of COS 1.0 had staved off anomie by providing a shared construct of
tradition for cohesive cultural groups, Enlightenment rationality broke the cultural whole
into distinct parts, applying more specialized forms of rationality and validation systems
to each.
COS 3.0: The Civic Canopy
While in many ways the secular canopy has served us well—COS 2.0 enabled an
unprecedented expansion of individual benefit and social transformation—it has been in
crisis for decades. The first signs of its impending end can be traced to Nietzsche, with
his withering critique of rationality as a mere facade for the “will to power.” Other
postmodern theorists have followed suit, and pointed out that the formal rules and
conventions of modernity are not in keeping with the complexities of our age. But the
10

signs of COS 2.0’s decline are apparent well beyond the circles of academic critique as
well. Virtually every public system—from education, to health care, to the criminal
justice system to even the classic form of the corporation—that was built on the industrial
model of COS 2.0 is beyond the breaking point and facing an overwhelming array of
challenges. But while the signs of crisis are everywhere, few have offered a positive
alternative toward which the new COS 3.0 might be oriented. That is the task of this
project.
Research Design and Overview
Research Questions
This project explores the challenge of the credo e pluribus unum as a question of
reconciling human diversity, or “the fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls 1996), with the
human quest for a unified cultural framework that provides stability, meaning, and order.
At the heart of my project lie two central questions:
•

What conditions enable people to successfully integrate their sense of
individual identity into a larger whole that is greater than themselves?

•

How might those conditions become part of larger social systems to expand
their positive impact on society?

I will explore these questions in three ways. First, will offer a critical reading of
relevant theory related to communicative action. Next, I will review effective practices
in existing communities which embody these theories. Finally, I will offer a design for a
scenario that would manifest these conditions on a broader scale. I will argue that the
solution to the challenge of e pluribus unum lies neither in choosing the unum over the
pluribus, nor the pluribus over the unum, but in seeing them as necessary and
complementary ingredients of social integration—made possible through the power of
11

communicative reason expressed through interpersonal dialogue, organizational
collaboration, and systemic transformation through civil society networks. Following
Habermas and incorporating the critiques of his respondents, I will argue that when we
engage with others under the right conditions, communicative reason allows us to meet
the challenge of e pluribus unum by drawing upon our unique and diverse perspectives to
construct an expanded sense of mutual understanding that is larger than, but inclusive of,
its constituent elements. I will then explore the fact that despite the growing evidence of
the salutary effects of a communicative response to interpersonal, institutional, and
systemic challenges, the current structures that shape most of our daily existence—our
beliefs, institutions, and systems—are rooted in and still reinforce the instrumental
rationality that epitomized the modern paradigm. I will argue that what is needed is to
construct a new nomos, or in modern parlance, a new “cultural operating system” that is
better matched to the challenges of our current condition and which resets the patterns of
beliefs, behaviors, and policies by which we run our shared enterprise. I will conclude by
offering a community learning model to help launch this new operating system. This
process, supported by a virtual “platform” for community engagement, enables diverse
networks of individuals and civil society institutions to work together toward common
goals, thus more effectively fulfilling the promise of e pluribus unum.
Methodology and Overview of Argument
The methodology for this project is a blend of critical essay and applied practice,
yielding what Ted Vial has called a “philosophically informed reflection.” I will draw
upon the theoretical and philosophical work of foundational thinkers like Habermas,
Levinas, Bohman, and Young; refer to the evidence gleaned from fields of collaborative
12

practice in service delivery systems; and reference both philosophical frameworks and
practical applications of complex and emergent systems theory. There are of course risks
in this method—dilettantism chief amongst them—but I agree with William Galston,
who, in reflecting on his approach to inquiry into public life, argued that
Methods of inquiry must suit objects of inquiry. I have the highest regard for
sustained philosophical reasoning, but often it is not enough to get us where we
want to go. For those seeking to craft a three-dimensional account of the basic
structures of public life, a diversity of material is essential. (Galston 2005, 6)
In Chapter Two I will take up the challenge that animated Habermas’s project—
namely, how to re-legitimize the social foundation of Western society after the crises of
Stalinism, World War II and the Holocaust revealed the inadequacy of COS 2.0 as an
integrating force for social action. I will review in general terms the outline of his
Theory of Communicative Action and explore his notion of communicative reason—
which is strengthened, I will argue, by improvements from his critics—through the
theoretical framework of deliberative democracy. I will argue that whatever its
weaknesses, Habermas’s effort to complete “the unfinished project of modernity” does
provide the essential foundation for the next stage of societal evolution: COS 3.0.
While a philosophical and theoretical response to the challenges of e pluribus
unum is essential to prevent the slide toward relativism and anomie that more radical
advocates of an “anti-foundationalist” view of postmodernity knowingly or unknowingly
unleashed, the successful resolution to the crisis of COS 2.0 ultimately hinges on a
practical relevance to the lives of real people struggling to solve real problems in real
communities. I will therefore look to examples of practitioners in the field of dialogue
and deliberative democracy to help make the case for the transformational qualities of
dialogue.
13

In Chapter Three, I will analyze communicative reason as a practical tool for
promoting collaboration among individuals, organizations, and systems. Building on the
research of Chrislip, Larson, and Hicks, I will explore the conditions under which
individuals and organizations effectively collaborate toward shared goals and the impact
collaboration has on community outcomes. I will then draw upon effective collaborative
models from other fields and synthesize their overlapping elements into a “community
learning model” that can be used to help communities successfully navigate the steps of
collaboration.
In Chapter Four, I will review the community learning model in more detail and
explore how it acts as an entry point into the “virtuous cycle” of collaboration that applies
to higher levels of organization within a community. Drawing upon Habermas and other
civil society theorists, as well as research from the natural sciences and organizational
development literature, I will then analyze how civil society functions as a type of
emergent ecosystem of the public sphere and abides by similar principles as other selforganizing systems. I will argue that for us to change the systemic structures of COS 2.0,
we must shift our conception of civil society from being a third sector alongside the
market and the state to being a self-organizing, emergent system that can reorient the
power of both the market and the state to function in alignment with agreed-upon
outcomes of community benefit. I will then explore the implications of the community
learning model through three case studies in which this model was applied to a
neighborhood context, a community context, and a statewide context, generating a list of
lessons learned and problems to solve. I will summarize the principles that can be
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distilled from such studies to offer a set of parameters for how the model can best be
applied to new and expanded contexts.
Finally, in Chapter Five, I will bring the theoretical and practical dimensions of
communicative reason to bear on a regional project to design what COS 3.0 might look
like with a fully developed civic canopy in place. In a type of “artist’s rendering” of a
proposed new design, I will argue that raising the civic canopy is best accomplished
through the use of the community learning model that incorporates ongoing, face-to-face
dialogue, organizational collaboration, and systemic change. In the end, I will make the
case that through a new, civic canopy, we can better meet the challenge of e pluribus
unum and acknowledge both our diversity and our unity within communities that are
dedicated to working toward common goals in service of our collective well being.
Summary
In light of the many reasons to bemoan the state of our contemporary civic health,
this project seeks to explore the convergence of several theoretical and practical bodies of
work which suggest that the communicative capacities and collaborative processes that
can adequately face the challenge of e pluribus unum at the local scale can in fact be
brought to a much larger scale. By situating our current challenges and opportunities
within the larger story of society’s evolution, the current signs of societal transformation
become more apparent. Through this project, the vision of a civil society functioning as a
vibrant ecosystem that nurtures the healthy development of all members is approached
through the intentional use of a community learning model that enables individuals and
organizations to collaborate more effectively toward common indicators of civic health.
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CHAPTER 2: COMMUNICATIVE REASON, DIALOGUE AND
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Introduction
In this chapter I will review Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action in its
broadest terms to build a foundation for the claim that the perennial challenge of e
pluribus unum, and particularly the challenge of reasonable pluralism that accompanies
it, is most adequately addressed through patterns of communication that are oriented
toward mutual understanding and which “take the other into account.” I will argue that
Habermas provides the foundation of this argument, but I will draw upon some of his
critics and respondents to address the shortcomings of his theory with a dialogical model
of communicative reason.
Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity
Habermas’s Roots in the Frankfurt School
To understand the societal transformation that has occurred in the past 50 years,
or what I am calling the shift from COS 2.0 to the gradual emergence of COS 3.0, we
must consider the world Habermas inherited as he entered the academy in the early
1950s. Habermas’s work began amidst the discussions of the Institute for Social
Research in Frankfurt, an institute founded in the 1920s, reorganized in the 1950s, and
known for its bold, interdisciplinary critique of modern society. Alongside his mentors
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Habermas worked to develop a critical theory of
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society with enough intellectual power to challenge the assumptions of Western culture’s
reigning ideology and capitalist structure, believing that “through an examination of
contemporary social and political issues they could contribute to a critique of ideology
and to the development of a non-authoritarian and non-bureaucratic politics" (Held 1980,
16). The Frankfurt School’s areas of inquiry ranged from the nature of capitalism and its
structures within modern society, to the rise of authoritarianism and bureaucracy, to the
structure and internal dynamics of the family, to the creation of mass culture and its
impact on psychological development. The practical realities of Nazi Germany and
World War II had a pronounced effect on the theoretical work of the Institute. After its
relocation to Columbia University in New York in the 1930s and eventual return to
Germany in the 1950s, the focus of the Institute’s founders had changed dramatically.
Several of them battled with suicidal pessimism in the aftermath of the war, and their
work lost the public viability that it enjoyed in the early 1930s. Most of the pioneering
members were ambivalent about their more radical roots in Marxism, and discouraged
their students of the 1950s from reading the early editions of the official publication of
the Institute, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (Jay 1984). What began as a bold
interdisciplinary project over time devolved into a loose affiliation of disparate attempts
to make sense out of the rubble of post-war European culture.
But while others followed the lead of Adorno and Horkheimer, abandoning the
hope that rationality could be anything but one more manifestation of power and taking a
skeptical eye at any attempt to construct new “metanarratives” to take its place (Lyotard ,
1979), Habermas parted company with his former mentors and remained dedicated to the
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“unfinished project of modernity” and the promise of liberation through the power of
reason. Instead of the subject-centered rationality of the Enlightenment, Habermas took
“a linguistic turn,” building on the work of Wittgenstein, Searle and Austin. This move
allowed him to uncouple his pursuit of reason from the freight of instrumental rationality
that perished in the wreckage of Nazism and fascism, and redirect his attention to an
intersubjective reason embedded in the nature of language. In his Theory of
Communicative Action (Habermas 1984), Habermas argues that the problem is not with
rationality per se, but the fact that instrumental rationality—with an emphasis on
efficiency, control, and the logic of systems—has colonized communicative rationality,
which is oriented toward mutual understanding. The other task, for Habermas, is to
construct the conditions that enable communicative reason to resume its proper place in
steering our social systems. Let us review how Habermas’ communicative reason
addresses the challenge of promoting cultural cohesion while still honoring difference.
Models of Rationality, Models of Democracy
The case can be made that the basic framework of constitutional democracy born
out of the Enlightenment is itself an answer to the challenge of e pluribus unum, at least
when compared to the long history of empires and autocratic rules that in effect sought to
solve the challenge by force and violence. However, following Benhabib, I believe that
“the global trend toward democratization is real, but so also are the oppositions and
antagonisms asserting themselves against this trend in the name of various forms of
‘difference’—ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and cultural” (Benhabib 1996, 3).
Like Benhabib and others, I contend that we can distinguish variations of democratic
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theory and practice that are more or less adequate to the task of managing these forces of
unity and difference. For reasons explored below, the most promising model is one
rooted in a communicative view of reasons, or what its proponents call deliberative
democracy.
Habermas framed the earliest conceptions of deliberative democracy by noting the
general distinctions between (1) civic republican models, which are predicated upon a
common ethical tradition that can be called upon to resolve questions of the common
good; (2) liberal models of democracy, which emphasize a constitutional arrangement of
rights and procedures that allow individuals to choose their own notions of the good; and
(3) a more deliberative model, where social behaviors are neither predicated upon
common traditions nor left up to pure procedures, but emerge through the process of
public reasoning (Habermas 1996). Since that early framework, more refined definitions
have been developed. Based on the proceedings from a 2010 symposium which included
many of the leading theorists in the field, Jane Mansbridge boils the basic notion of
deliberative democracy down to these essential elements:
There is considerable consensus among theorists on many of the regulative ideals
of deliberative democracy. . . The criterion that most clearly distinguishes
deliberative from non-deliberative mechanisms within democratic decision is that
in the regulative ideal, coercive power should be absent from the purely
deliberative mechanisms. Participants should not try to change others’ behavior
through the threat of sanction or the use of force. (Mansbridge et al. 2010, 66)
If there is shared agreement on the basic parameters of what constitutes
deliberative democracy, there are important differences in how theorists describe the
basic mechanism within deliberation itself that accounts for its noncoercive power. Some
describe the means of bringing conflicting worldviews into accord as a process of
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reaching an “overlapping consensus” (Rawls 1996); others argue that a more inclusive
definition of “reason-giving” amongst a plurality of voices is what leads to more
sophisticated articulations of justice (Young 1990); still others argue that new methods of
linguistic interaction may help us transcend these differences and reach a higher level of
moral development (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997). Speaking about deliberative
democracy as a regulative ideal, Young claims that
In the deliberative model democracy is a form of practical reason. Participants in
the democratic process offer proposals for how best to solve problems or meet
legitimate needs, and so on, and they present arguments through which they aim
to persuade others to accept their proposals. Democratic process is primarily a
discussion of problems, conflicts, claims of need or interest. Through dialogue
others test and challenge these proposals and arguments. Because they have not
stood up to dialogic examination, the deliberating public rejects or refines some
proposals. Participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences
have greatest numerical support, but by determining which proposals the
collective agrees are supported by the best reasons. (Young 2000, 22-23)
In distinguishing between decisions reached through the exchange of reasons
from those arrived at through the greatest numerical support, Young draws the same
distinction as Habermas between two types of reasoning: instrumental reason
communicative reason. Instrumental reason coordinates social behavior through the
steering mechanism of attaining intended ends. In contrast, communicative reason
requires actors to coordinate actions and resolve differences through language and the
steering mechanism of coordinating meaning. If instrumental reason is rooted in notions
of efficiency, according to Habermas, the rationality inherent in communication is based
on the common presupposition amongst participants to reach understanding. With each
speech act—be it asking someone to pass the salt shaker, verify the cause of an epidemic,
or support a program to help reduce violence—we make claims upon each other that
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require the listener to make a yes/no response. If called upon, we can give reasons for
our claims, and this reasoning-for and reasoning-against is the essence of the
intersubjective rationality embedded in communication. This communicative sphere
functions because, Habermas argues, all competent users of a language tap into a
common lifeworld, a collection of meanings, assumptions, vocabulary, and the like that
allow us to make sense of each other’s truth claims. Rather than being forced or coerced
to accept the results of an exchange, it is the force of the better argument that prevails,
with each participant drawing upon the lifeworld to find the means by which to advance
that claim (Habermas 1984, 120). This is true of our actions no less than our statements.
When there is a breakdown in this process—words are misunderstood, actions not
squared with present understandings—participants can seek to repair that breakdown by
asking the other to clarify, or to redeem the claim they are making. Through this
discursive process, the lifeworld is reinforced, and the body of unproblematic agreements
thus expands.
Central to the process of mutual understanding in Habermas’ account is the
assumption that both participants in the exchange recognize each other as equals who are
free to take a yes/no position toward each other’s claims. There is no effort made to
convince the other against her will, or to merely “get what one wants” from the other.
Should this occur, the exchange would cease to be rooted in communicative rationality
and would become an example of instrumental rationality aimed at achieving strategic
success. Of course, discussants often fail to suspend judgments and abide by rules of
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argumentation as implied by Habermas’ notion of an “ideal speech situation” (Habermas
1999, 87-89). This does not invalidate his claim, however, since:
The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor simply a
construct, but a reciprocal supposition [Unterstellung] unavoidable in discourse.
This supposition can, but need not be, counterfactual; but even when
counterfactual it is a fiction that is operatively effective in communication. I
would therefore prefer to speak of an anticipation of an ideal speech situation. .
.This anticipation alone is the warrant that permits us to join to an actually
attained consensus the claim of a rational consensus. At the same time it is a
critical standard against which every actually realized consensus can be called
into question and tested. (Habermas 1973, 258)
This is a critical point to consider, and one to which we will return after reviewing
critiques of Habermas’s position. He is essentially claiming that far from being some
rarified situation that we seldom find, the ideal speech situation is a presupposed
condition of our everyday speech. We would not even begin to speak to each other if we
did not believe we could be understood by one another, and that our claims could in fact
produce convincing reasons with which others might agree. Most importantly, this
capacity is not a function of extensive training, elaborate philosophies, or political
conditions. It is instead part of the everyday capacity of competent language users—a
capacity that most humans develop by the age of five. Habermas further argues—and as
we shall see, others will take him to task on this very point—that participants engaged in
discourse can reach consensus, and thereby coordinate their differing social perspectives,
in the areas of truth (objectivity), normative rightness (morality), and personal sincerity
(subjectivity). These validity claims are rooted in a postmetaphysical definition of
reason—one that need not appeal to all-encompassing metaphysical systems,
philosophies of consciousness, or philosophies of history (Rehg 1998, viii). Instead,
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participants make universal claims of truth and moral rightness—e.g., the earth is round
not just for me but for all people—that transcend the specific context from which they
were made and yet are always regarded as fallible and subject to revision at a later date.
What gives them validity is the “yes” granted by other members of the discourse who are
subject to the implications of the statements. In the case of empirical truth claims
(objectivity), this process is familiar to most of us. Agreement upon facts is achieved
through a process of scientific argumentation that tests ideas against rigorous standards of
interrogation from others in the scientific community to see if the claims hold up against
other evidence. In the case of personal sincerity (subjectity), the type of argumentation is
much akin to a psychological analysis, where we judge the sincerity and validity of
statements made by an individual as compared with his or her actions and previous
statements. Are the statements consistent with what he or she has said before? Can we
believe what is being said in light of what we know from previous actions? In the sphere
of empirical truth claims and claims of sincerity, the secular canopy as COS 2.0 has held
up admirably even into our own age.
The third sphere of normative rightness (morality), however, is where we must
face the challenge of reasonable pluralism. As we have already discussed, resolving
disputed claims of normative rightness poses little challenge to the world of COS 1.0, as
social norms are typically well established and form an unquestioned set of parameters
within which social actions are coordinated. In modern societies, however, we lack a
shared sense of how we ought to live and coordinate our actions together—we have
differing notions of “the good.” Our differing moral claims are often the cause of
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disagreements, and they must be continually redeemed within a highly pluralistic context.
Habermas argues that redeeming such claims requires people to coordinate their differing
interests into a collective will, born not simply of an aggregation of individual interests
and preferences but created from the deliberative process in which each person consents
to a larger general will:
The public deliberation that leads to the formation of a general will has the form
of a debate in which competing particular interests are given equal consideration.
It requires of participants that they engage in ‘ideal role-taking’ to try to
understand the situations and perspectives of others and give them equal weight to
their own. This adoption of the standpoint of impartiality is what distinguishes an
orientation toward justice from a concern merely with one’s own interests or with
those of one’s group. (McCarthy 1992, 54)
Habermas argues that even cultural norms can be susceptible to rational
argumentation. This leaves the possibility open that one or another norm rooted in a
particular cultural tradition can indeed become a universally agreed upon norm, even for
those from other traditions. Or conversely, as in the notable cases of slavery in our own
country and more recently female genital mutilation in African countries, what was once
a shared cultural norm within a given cultural group gives way, through argumentation
and through collective action, to a new shared understanding that has normative force.
As McCarthy points out, Habermas acknowledges that this is not always possible, but he
contends that we must always enter the discussion with the presupposition that it could
indeed be possible to justify any cultural norm through reasoned deliberation (McCarthy
1973, 59). Similarly, Georgia Warnke adds that Habermas’ theory allows for people to
become more skilled at the art of applying generally agreed-upon norms to contested
contexts, and that this process can, over time, become more likely to produce consensus
24

(Warnke 1995). In short, Habermas is advancing a claim, fallible though it might be, that
we have within our general capacities an ability to reach consensus on even apparently
incommensurable cultural disagreements, and that the hope of such consensus lies in the
mechanisms of discursive “give and take” conducted among equal partners.
Rawls and Habermas: Two Views of Consensus
To summarize the argument thus far, Habermas claims that language holds within
it the possibility of reconciling even radically divergent notions of what is true and what
is good—so long as we can create the procedures for holding such conversations in a fair
way. This claim is subject to numerous critiques on different grounds. According to
Rawls, Habermas overreaches in seeking to make normative claims grounded in
“comprehensive world views” open to public critique through reason. Any effort to
adjudicate differences between fundamentally divergent worldviews goes beyond a
description of the procedures we need to reach fair terms of agreement about political
matters and instead smuggles in a worldview or comprehensive doctrine that, more than
simply describing how competing comprehensive doctrines might be adjudicated,
actually takes a stand in favor of one (Rawls 1996, 376). Rawls believes we need a more
limited framework of procedures that simply leaves some discussions off the public table
because they will undermine the limited but stable overlapping consensus that exists
between opposing comprehensive doctrines. The nature of such a consensus is
essentially this: given the fact of reasonable pluralism that exists in contemporary society,
which admits divergent comprehensive doctrines, the most we can hope for is an
agreement on a fair procedure that allows us to resolve our disputes in terms that all can
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agree to. This agreement is basically a liberal, constitutional framework, the existence of
inviolable rights and protections (essentially contained in the U.S. Bill of Rights), and the
ongoing adjudication of disputes through systems of legislation and judicial review.
Rawls believes these are the kinds of “rules of the game” we would all agree to before
jumping into the particular identities we develop in our particular circumstances (397).
Rawls’ view of fair terms of engagement would be upended if people were
allowed to appeal to their comprehensive doctrines during the course of deliberation.
How, asks Rawls, could policy be determined if during the course of debate the reasons a
legislator offered for a given law derived from a verse from the Bible or Koran? In this
sense, public reason is singular, applying to only those overlapping beliefs about fairness
to which everyone in a just society can lay claim—not to those beliefs which are only a
part of particular comprehensive doctrine: “If, when stand-offs occur, citizens invoke
the grounding reasons of their comprehensive views, then the principle of reciprocity is
violated” ( lv). While some critics argue that this is unfair to ask of people, and that
people should not have to give up their deeply held beliefs when making public
decisions, Rawls counters that we do this all the time within our system—and rightly so.
Who would not, for instance, prefer the “partial truth” of only allowing evidence
admitted into court that has been gained through fair means, instead of allowing “the
whole truth” if it was gathered through unethical means that violated important rights and
protections—including torture or entrapment (219)? For Rawls, it is better to have a
system that all can support as fair but which requires everyone to give up a little bit of
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what they would ultimately want for the greater good of political stability and continued
cooperation toward a more just social order.
For theorists like Gutmann and Thompson, however, Rawls gives up too quickly
on the possibilities of resolving the moral disagreements endemic to the reasonable
pluralism of our times. Where Rawls’s definition of reciprocity involves an admission
that it is unfair to ask someone to entertain a reason that violates their deeply held
comprehensive doctrine, Gutmann and Thompson expand the possibilities of reciprocity
to include “deliberative disagreement,” in which participants “continue to differ about
basic moral principles even though they seek a resolution that is mutually justifiable”
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 73). This allows people to shift the nature of the
preferences they bring to the table upon further reflection in the process of deliberation.
Deliberation asks people to acknowledge at times the levels of uncertainty in a situation
and the reasonableness of another’s position. In other words, even people who disagree
over fundamental values—such as abortion—can come to recognize the moral worthiness
of an opponent’s position, and respect the position even if they disagree with it. Such
reasoning can, at times, invoke the kinds of appeals to comprehensive doctrines that
Rawls would disallow, provided the arguer does not expect those who disagree to accept
those reasons as a condition of reaching consensus. This allows for the continued
cooperation of those who hold divergent comprehensive doctrines (77).
If, however, resolution is not reached through consensus, as it often is not,
Gutmann and Thompson argue that there is still room for accommodation and bargaining.
Accommodation involves civic integrity (making sure our words match our deeds, and
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that we are aware of the larger implications of our moral principles); civic magnanimity
(a willingness to acknowledge the moral status of ideas which one opposes and the
presence of an open mind about one’s own position), and the economy of moral
disagreement (“in justifying policies on moral grounds, citizens should seek the rationale
that minimizes rejection of the position they oppose” (85)). These qualities expand the
space within which we might find reasonable terms of continued cooperation, even if we
disagree. When all else fails, there is still room for bargaining in a deliberative model,
bargaining that is qualitatively different from that conducted in interest-group models of
representative democracy, because it still acknowledges the legitimacy of the views of
one’s opponents rather than a “winner take all” mode of operation. In more common
terms, reciprocity thus amounts to mutual respect, and encourages “citizens and public
officials to appreciate the moral character of the positions of people with whom they
disagree” (90).
While the case for deliberation made by Habermas and Rawls and expanded by
Gutmann and Thompson offers great possibilities, many critics remain unsatisfied by
these scholars’ good intentions and focus instead on the ways in which the promises of
deliberation remain unfulfilled. While Gutmann and Thompson expand Rawls’ limits of
what is fair game for deliberation to include some elements of comprehensive doctrines,
critics argue that they do so without challenging the basic assumptions of deliberative
interaction itself—assumptions that privilege those already in power. Darrin Hicks, for
instance, wonders what, after all, does deliberation offer to someone who already feels
marginalized by the systems of power in society? Deliberative democracy on the
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previous account does offer even a marginalized person promise of including her voice as
being worthy of mutual respect, but if
the ideal of public reason forces her to refrain from invoking her feelings, faiths,
and traditions to support her political proposals or to translate them in such a way
that they are indistinguishable from the dominant public idiom, doesn’t it cancel
out the very promise of deliberative democracy? (Hicks 2002, 247)
Iris Marion Young takes this same question as her point of departure for arguing
that the promise of public deliberation can only be redeemed through greater inclusion of
historically marginalized and “structurally differentiated” groups (Young 2000, 80). This
is in large part true because the views of those who occupy different social positions than
the presumed norm in society offer a vital resource to the political process: they reveal
the very inequities that are implicit in structural differences of income, class, gender,
race, and education. By doing so, they provide valuable insights into and knowledge of
the social realities that obtain in a given context. Without being held accountable to these
perspectives, those in power can continue to reason based on false premises and pursue
personal interests while wrapping themselves in the language of justice and the common
good. In Young’s view, it is much more difficult for the corporate lawyer to deny the
presence of toxic substances, or claim that the factory is only acting in the “public good”
when there is a resident at the table who lives near a polluting factory and shares his or
her medical history. Young argues that the emphasis placed on espousing a common
good by those in the majority is often simply a reflection of their privileged position,
which mistakenly assumes that their own invisible assumptions and values are held in
common by all members of society. This tendency to advocate for a normative common
good benefits those who have the most to gain from the status quo, because it can quickly
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become a means of disallowing any positions that seek to challenge the status quo by
attacking them as appearing disorderly, disruptive, or uncivil. The antidote to this vicious
cycle is neither to promote the private interests of marginalized groups nor to continue to
bracket social differences while aiming at the common good, but the “third way” of
greater inclusion of social perspectives:
On this account, the only way to expose that such claims to the common good
serve certain particular interests or reflect the experience and perspective of
particular social segments primarily is publicly to assert the interests not served
by the allegedly common policies, and publicly to articulate the specificity of the
experiences and perspectives they exclude. (109)
One important step in accomplishing this is to expand the terms of deliberation to
include not just rational, dispassionate speech, but also the more culture-laden forms of
greeting, testimony, and narrative. These forms allow people in different social positions
and from different backgrounds to draw upon different communicative “virtues” to
express their reasons and their perspectives in a public context (80). Far from being
simply an accommodation to the process to prevent those who feel excluded from
disengaging from the process of public deliberation, and potentially undermining its
effort, expanding the forms of communicative participation increases the actual process
of deliberation and the quality of its outcomes:
Inclusion of differentiated groups is important not only as a means of
demonstrating equal respect and to ensure that all legitimate interests in the polity
receive expression, though these are fundamental reasons for democratic
inclusion. Inclusion has two additional functions. First, it motivates participants
in political debate to transform their claims from mere expressions of selfregarding interest to appeals to justice. Secondly, it maximizes the social
knowledge available to a democratic public, such that citizens are more likely to
make just and wise decisions. (115)
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Deliberative Democracy and the Inclusion of the Other
For deliberative democracy to reap the benefits that Young outlines, inclusion
must mean far more than a superficial tokenism of diverse constituents sitting at the
public table of deliberation. It must also entail a deep commitment to equality once
people take their seats, which is not a simple matter. What definition of equality, for
instance, must be in place for citizens who enjoy very different social privileges to truly
be equal in a given process of deliberation? Recalling Habermas’s notion of the ideal
speech situation, such equality means that nothing but the force of the better argument
should hold sway—not one’s social status, political connections, or other indicators of
instrumental influence. For James Bohman, equality should be considered as a function
of “effective social freedom,” which borrows from the “capacities approach” of Amartya
Sen (Bohman 2002). In Bohman’s view, we must conceive of someone’s deliberative
capacity as related to their ability to “initiate public deliberation about their concerns,”
rather than simply in terms of eloquence, command of the language of power, or
familiarity with the rules and procedures governing public debate (333). Not that such
attributes are not capacities themselves, but more importantly for Bohman is the ability to
identify issues of public concern and to act so as to make them the topic of discussion in
the public agenda. In this sense, even marginalized groups can point to a long history of
raising issues for public deliberation that emerged out of non-deliberative mechanisms—
community organizing, public actions, and sympathetic endorsements by allies in power.
The attempt to equalize people’s capacities to initiate deliberation even amidst
inequitable distribution of resources is also at the heart of public efforts around campaign
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finance reform and public access to the airwaves for political advertising (Knight and
Johnson 2002, 304).
But as Knight and Johnson (2002) point out, this threshold of equality is too crude
an instrument to assess the more subtle inequalities that typically impact deliberation in
the public sphere. To address this, Darrin Hicks adds to the list of deliberative capacities
a set of argumentative skills that strengthens each individual’s deliberative capacities:

Participants should afford a special respect to minority views that are often
ignored in traditional public outlets, adjust to their interlocutor’s frame of
reference to establish an identification of common interests, restrain from
impulses to become defensive when their positions and the ideals they are
founded upon are questioned, maintain an openness to criticism and the demand
for justification, and, perhaps most importantly, temper intelligence with humility
and feel comfortable with letting others have the last word. (Hicks 2002, 232)
Hicks argues further that for all citizens to develop these capacities, our public
education system will require a significant overhaul in terms of its ability to prepare
students—all students, but especially those from the most disadvantaged backgrounds—
for the full responsibilities of democratic deliberation. In the meantime, we are left to ask
ourselves what steps, if any, might be taken to strengthen the powers of individuals, even
on a small scale, to make deliberative spaces more equal? The same question can be
asked of inclusion and public reason as well. Is it possible to envision a deliberative
model in which people are capable of reconciling deep moral conflict, across differences,
on equal footing?
Bohman: The Dialogical Turn
James Bohman’s response to this challenge to is to take a dialogical turn. In
contrast to both Rawls’ procedural view, where certain topics are simply left off the table
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of public deliberation, and Habermas’s discursive view, where only certain types of
validity claims can be redeemed through a discursive process of claims and counter
claims, Bohman sees public deliberation as “a dialogical process of exchanging reasons
for the purpose of resolving problematic situations that cannot be settled without
interpersonal coordination and cooperation” (Bohman 2000, 27). To evaluate his project,
let us return to the discussion of Habermas’s approach that we left unresolved above.
What is at stake here are the kind of mechanisms that Habermas and Bohman both offer
as an explanation of why deliberation should be trusted to provide what seems so absent
in our public life—the means of resolving contentious moral and political claims, and of
including the wide spectrum of participants in society on equal footing in the
conversation.
To begin with, let us be clear that much of Bohman’s work is indebted to
Habermas’s foundational efforts to secure a normative basis for communicatively reached
agreements. What is in question, then, is the most accurate explanation of why such
agreements are possible, and the most practical description of how this process actually
plays out in reality. To pick up where we left off with Habermas, we recall that
Habermas contends that the process of redeeming claims is of a discursive nature,
meaning that both the type of claim and the terms of its redemption are contained in the
structure of the language itself—certain claims imply certain types of validation and
presuppose certain underlying conditions. In addition, through discourse we
acknowledge that there is a distinction between the claims we make about reality and
reality itself. This is why discourse is a reflective form of communication, because we
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not only make claims about reality, but we can reflect on the very nature of those claims,
and decide which in fact are more accurate in light of what we know about the world.
Stating “we catch colds from viruses, not from going outside without a coat” involves a
different type of discourse than do the statements “we ought not buy products from
companies that mistreat their workers” and “I am a big Red Sox fan.” In the first, we
presuppose an objective world order, a singular explanation that is true where competing
explanations are false. In the second, we presuppose a normative universe whose rules
everyone should live by, one that compels us to act in certain ways, rather than a universe
where people are not subject to the same set of rules. In the third, we presuppose a world
in which people are honest or not, sincere or deceptive, as determined by their subjective
experiences and value systems.
By presupposing this combination of an objective world, a social world shared by
members of a group, and plural subjective worlds of different participants builds a
coordinate system that enables a type of shared triangulation and cooperative negotiation
to reach the truth (Laftont 2002, 189). These coordinates allow us to orient our claims
against a common framework, subject to “the better argument” about which claim more
accurately maps the terrain. In this regard, Bohman and Habermas operate within the
same coordinate system, but Bohman follows a more dialogical approach that expands
both the nature of truth claims and the types of formal reasons that can redeem them:
In specialized argumentation, speakers may develop generalized accounts of how
certain claims may be warranted. In ordinary deliberation, by contrast, various
claims are often mixed together so that is difficult to tell in advance what type of
reason will be convincing in any particular situation. Public deliberation at this
level is dialogical rather than discursive in the strict sense. It emerges whenever
second-order communication, the exchange and testing of reasons, is needed to
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resolve atypical and non-standard problematic situations or breakdowns of
coordination; but usually there is no well-established means for resolving such
problems, or these means themselves are called into question. The conditions for
the activity of dialogue are more important than argumentation per se to
understanding how public reasons are convincing under such circumstances.
Argumentation is deliberative only when it is dialogical, in the give and take of
arguments among speakers. (Bohman 2002, 42)

Bohman’s model of deliberation, then, suggests that rather than looking to the
adjudication process found in a court of law as our model of deliberation, that
It is better to see public deliberation as itself a joint, cooperative form of social
action. This shift to cooperative action as the proper model for deliberation not
only makes sense of how political problems are actually solved, if they can be; it
also makes better sense of the requirements for the political agreements that
emerge in complex and diverse societies. Rather than being another appeal to
practices as the basis of shared agreements, deliberation depends on a different
aspect of social action: the accountability of intelligible action to others and the
reflexive ability of actors to continue cooperation by extending accountability to
all actors and to new situations. (54)
Along with switching the context of public deliberation from a discursive to a
dialogical model, Bohman also exchanges the paradigmatic metaphor from a courtroom
to a jazz trio. Deliberation is a form of collective problem-solving on public matters,
where each group participates in the construction of a whole that no part could construct
on their own. This is a specific kind of collective action, different from more strategic or
instrumental actions that have a clearly identified, easily measured goal.
Unlike a joint activity that is engaged in to achieve some collective goal, the
success of a dialogue cannot always be specified in a means-end way. The
outcomes of a dialogue are often unforeseeable from the perspective of any
particular actor. Even if a dialogue is supposed to produce an agreement, it
cannot easily be predicted how or when such an agreement will be produced. (56)
This is because the kinds of reasons that people will find compelling in the
moment of dialogue cannot be determined in advance. In contrast to ethical
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“monologues,” in which the making and redemption of validity claims are made
philosophically outside of our lived experience, dialogue is “a once-occurrent Beingevent of life” (Bakhtin 1993, 20), a point of discontinuity that disrupts any attempts to
merely extrapolate from past events along a linear, predetermined equation. Though it is
not entirely clear that Habermas would disagree, Bohman is making the case that we
cannot “predict in advance of the dialogue the content of ‘the kind of reasons we are
prepared to recognize’ as legitimate, other than that they are public. Public reasons
simply continue the cooperative dialogue” (Bohman 2002, 57). True to form, Bohman
offers reasons for his assertion as he describes in detail the kinds of conditions that allow
dialogical cooperation for “restoring ongoing joint activity.” These include testing and
surfacing assumptions, sharing stories, moving back and forth between the general norm
and the concrete specification, articulation of more abstract ideals that resolve apparent
tensions, and taking the perspective of others (59-65).
Summary
I have argued that Habermas’s project of pursuing the emancipatory power of
reason in the guise of a Theory of Communicative Action has proven to be both a more
compelling response to the crisis of COS 2.0—the end of modernity’s subject-centered
rationality—than the more pessimistic strains of postmodernism found in the writings of
Nietzsche and his more contemporary post-structuralist descendents. First, Habermas
offers a normative basis of critique by grounding it in communicative reason and the
intersubjective agreements reached through mutual understanding of competent language
users. Second, he enables actors to coordinate their actions in a non-coercive manner
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through the “unforced force of the better argument.” Finally, his approach offers the
possibility of social transformation by resisting the “colonization of the lifeworld by the
systems world” through the hope of revitalized public sphere of diverse actors.
Where Habermas falls short—offering too narrow an account of reasoning that
participants would find compelling and too narrowly circumscribing the terms of
“consensus” as the necessary outcome of deliberation—his fellow deliberative theorists
are able to augment his basic argument. In particular, Bohman’s “dialogical turn” proves
particularly important in reframing the social construction of meaning and continued
engagement that will prove critical in a full definition of COS 3.0. Fleshing out this
definition will take a deeper exploration of the meaning and power of dialogue in this
equation.
Dialogue: Thinking, Speaking, and Being for the Other
Bohman’s move to make deliberation more dialogical hinges on the need to
expand the pool of potential reasons to which participants can appeal in their attempts to
reconcile their plural worldviews within a common understanding of a given public
problem and still continue to agree to work together to solve it. In doing so, Bohman
formulates a view of dialogue that is more accommodating to difference than Habermas’s
view of deliberation, which requires participants to reach consensus based on reasons that
convince the parties in the same way (Bohman 2000, 88). While Bohman does correct a
weakness in Habermas’s argument that stems from too narrow a view of rationality,
neither Bohman nor Habermas can give us a full account of what actually transpires in
the act of dialogue. Both Bohman and Habermas seem to take the challenge of pluralism
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as ultimately a challenge of accommodating fixed positions, with Bohman offering more
ways for them to continue to work with their differences constructively. In what follows,
I will argue that rather than just being a more elastic means of accommodating difference,
dialogue, as described by David Bohm, M. M. Bakhtin, and Emmanuel Levinas, is a way
of thinking, speaking, and being that manifests our connection to and responsibility for
the other. As such, it is the sine qua non of an effective integration of part and whole,
and the secret to a successful resolution to the challenge of e pluribus unum. This view
of dialogue as constituting human interconnection offers a way to both unify the
participants in the discussion, and yet preserve the autonomy of a unique self and other.
As such, it is the underlying platform of the emerging COS 3.0.
Bohm: The Communion of Thinking Together
While thinking is typically considered to be a solitary act, more monological than
dialogical, the work of David Bohm challenges that assumption. For Bohm, dialogue is a
matter of “thinking together.” Often regarded as one of the pre-eminent physicists of the
20th Century, Bohm dedicated the latter part of his career to outlining a philosophy of
dialogue. Drawing upon parallels from theoretical physics, Bohm analyzed the
underlying structures of thought and concluded that our thinking—far from helping us
solve the problems we face—is generally the cause of those problems. We inherit a
fragmented set of understandings from the world around us, laden with conflicting
assumptions that lead to unproductive patterns of behavior. Since this transmission of
fragmentation is typically invisible, we are all left believing that the fragmentation exists
in the world “out there,” not in the thinking “in here.” Blind to this trickery of thought,
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we never suspect it as a culprit: “Thought is very active, but the process of thought
thinks that it is doing nothing—that it is just telling you the way things are. . . The point
is: thought produces results, but thought says it didn’t do it” (Bohm 1996, 10). In the
face of challenges to its way of seeing the world, “Thought defends its basic assumptions
against evidence that they may be wrong” (11). Examples of this have been documented
for some time—from Gordon Allport’s research on the nature of prejudice (Allport
1954), to Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of the tendency in science to disregard discrepant data
(Kuhn 1962), to Chris Argyris’ studies of organizational learning (Argyris 1992; 1996).
As the familiar saying goes, we do not see the world as it is, but as we are.
In Bohm’s view, dialogue is the “flow of meaning” that allows us to suspend our
attachment to the assumptions we hold, allowing us to be set free from the unconscious
hold on our behaviors. When we suspend our assumptions and no longer hold them
dearly or defend them against the perceived threats of others, we can see the
fragmentations and divisions they create. In dialogue, we are not just advancing our own
claims but trying to think about everyone’s claims. This leads to a state of more coherent
thought in which we share meaning and experience the wholeness of our differing views.
We may still disagree, but we understand the nature and meaning of our disagreement
and better understand the ways in which we unwittingly cause many of the very problems
we are trying to solve. In dialogue, people have a way of bringing together their differing
and conflicting sets of assumptions, even ones that appear mutually exclusive, and
holding them in a state of creative wonder. There need be no attempt to solve them,
resolve them, or force an agreement on which set of assumptions is the right one: “The
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object of dialogue is not to analyze things, or to win an argument, or to exchange
opinions. Rather, it is to suspend your opinions and to look at the opinions—listen to
everybody’s opinions, to suspend them, and to see what all that means” (Bohm 1996, 26).
Once liberated from having to defend our assumptions against challenges from others,
and no longer busy persuading others of the merits of our assumptions, we are free to
take in the whole scope of views and perceptions of those around us. This is what leads to
new understandings and new meanings.
If we think back to Bohman’s conception of dialogue, as a force for expanding the
kinds of reasons that participants in deliberation will find compelling and that will
encourage them to remain at the table, we see that Bohm is expanding this process even
more radically. Instead of presuming that diametrically opposed positions are fixed
constructs that must be “accommodated” through deliberation, Bohm makes the
argument that the problem of fragmentation and conflicting viewpoints is a manifestation
of internalized, fragmented thinking and that such problems are often solved and
“dissolved” once people come to see the patterns and structural traps that cause the
fragmentation in the first place. This unleashes enormous potential for creative energy to
emerge and for partners to sense a new level of coherence in their thinking together. Bill
Isaacs, a student of Bohm’s, explains it this way:
Physicist David Bohm once compared conversations to the field behavior of a
superconductor. In a superconductor, electrons moving through a wire are cooled
to the point where they no longer collide or create heat through resistance.
Instead, after reaching an optimally low temperature, they begin to act like parts
of a coherent whole, moving around obstacles like ballet dancers on a stage.
Under these conditions the electrons flow with virtually no friction. They have
both high intensity and high ‘intelligence’ as they naturally align themselves with
an invisible pattern. Similarly, when we are in dialogue and are thinking together
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in a coordinated fashion, we are like the cool intensity of these fields of electrons.
Rather than seeing our conversations as the crashing and careening of billiard
balls, individuals may come to see and feel them as fields in which a sense of
wholeness can appear, intensify, and diminish in intensity again. (Isaacs 1999,
235)
As Isaacs makes clear, not all thinking is dialogical, but when it is, there is a way
of experiencing unity even amidst a diversity of thinkers. This unity, like the energy of a
field, allows for difference and coherence within the same container. Rather than
focusing on thoughts, which so typically divide us, Bohm encourages us to acknowledge
the dialogical way of thinking that is rooted in a deeper wholeness.
Admittedly, at first blush Bohm’s work can appear as ethereal and even romantic.
However, the efforts of his many students, including Peter Senge’s work on learning
organizations (Senge 1990) and Isaacs’ work on dialogue (Isaacs 1999) have had
concrete and lasting impact in hundreds of corporate and community contexts over the
past 20 years. One particularly noteworthy example is the work Isaacs and his colleagues
helped launch around health care reform in Grand Junction, Colorado. In 1992, as the
Clinton Administration first began its efforts to reform health care, the CEO of St. Mary’s
Hospital, Sister Lynne Casey, approached Bill Isaacs and his colleagues from the
Dialogue Project at MIT’s Organizational Learning Center to assist in their effort to solve
the challenges they were experiencing in the Grand Valley. Despite previous efforts
among the many players in the health care system in recent years, “many people believed
that the historic competitiveness and antagonism between the institutions were intractable
barriers to collaborative reform” (Weston and Saunders 1995, 3). The dialogue process
that unfolded between 1992 and 1994, which was in large part based on Bohm’s
principles, brought together 40 leaders from various aspects of the healthcare system in
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Grand Junction and had them reflect on the patterns of thinking that had created the
“intractable barriers” between them—patterns that led to judgments, mistrust, and
animosity between the players. As Barbara Sowada, a staff member at St. Mary’s
Hospital and one of the participants in the early stage of the dialogues, later recounted,
Looking back, the project’s problem resided in our own thinking, steeped in
Newtonian physics and Cartesian thought. Our conversations tacitly recapitulated
three beliefs that society largely takes for granted: health care is an independent
entity, money and morals are separate issues, and facts are more important than
feelings. From my present vantage point, I see that we were not aware of our own
ignorance regarding multiple definitions of health and care. It never occurred to
us to question the schizophrenic beliefs inherent in the modern health care system.
Moreover, we were very much afraid of loss of control and more attentive to the
national political scene than we cared to admit to each other. (Sowada 2003, xiv)
As the dialogues progressed, gradually these patterns of thought and the
destructive patterns they had created became clearer to the group. One doctor shared his
insights in this regard with the group:
‘I am struck by the last couple of comments, how absolutely schizophrenic my
behavior is—when it comes to care of a patient and my care for you. When I deal
with patients, there’s a [belief] that’s hammered into you, that you never resolve a
set of symptoms on the level of the diagnosis. To jump to a diagnosis is a
disaster. A chest pain can be a spider bite, an ulcer, pneumonia, or a heart attack.
The minute I call it one or the other, I ignore the other possibilities. I don’t deal
with patients and medicine that way, yet I do deal with all of you that way.’
(Isaacs 1999, 104)
Isaacs explains this process of jumping to inferences and never even knowing we
do it as part of the basic structure of the human brain on which we rely to filter out the
overwhelming amount of information that bombards us constantly. As a result, we
operate with what he calls “theories in use,” or patterns of thought that govern our actions
in ways we are largely unaware of. In fact, not only are we unaware of these theories in
use, but they often contradict our espoused beliefs. According to Isaacs,
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There is a gap or a contrast between their espoused belief and what they do in real
life. So many people say ‘be open, act transparently, be collaborative’ but when
you watch them, they are dictatorial, they are defensive, officious, etc. They don't
do any of those things they said. And they are unaware of doing that. We say
they act with a certain design, and they also design an awareness about that
design. (Isaacs 2010)
When people surface these theories in use, they see the basic structures of thought
that are producing the patterned behavior in the systems around them, and in so doing,
become more open to building new patterns of thinking and patterns of acting. As a
result, problems that once seemed insurmountable sometimes give way, and new
possibilities emerge that were not there before.
In the Grand Junction case, such transformations set in motion a series of
agreements and dramatic changes that helped contribute to the fact that Grand Junction is
looked to as a national model for collaborative, affordable health care (Gawande 2009;
Riccardi 2009). There are of course a number of reasons why Grand Junction has
achieved the success it has (Nichols, Weinberg and Barnes 2009) so we ought not draw
too close of a connection between these early steps of dialogue and their current success
as a system. Still, Isaacs notes that the depth of the conversation within the group did
reach levels that produced significant shifts in people’s understandings and behaviors:
The big challenge at the time was how in the world will you ever produce some
kind of common sense of purpose among all of these completely disparate
elements. That was the focus of the work, and it did come together very deeply in
many ways. . .We don't really have the data to say definitely what causes what,
but my experience is that when you get to the deep layers of purpose, the impacts
of the change are relatively stable over time. We have seen that in any number of
contexts. (Isaacs 2010)
I reference Bohm’s ideas, and Isaac’s reflection on these ideas in practice, not to
suggest that all differences in worldview will, through dialogue, give way to spontaneous
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acts of convergent agreement. Substantive differences of opinion will remain, and people
will maintain their different comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 1996). What can change,
however, through dialogue as an act of learning to think together, is that the assumptions
we hold about those differences—e.g., that they make conflict inevitable, or that our
behaviors must be defensive because of them, or that “they” are wrong and “we” are
right—are ultimately more likely to be the root of the challenges we face than the actual
differences themselves. In this sense, we might say that Bohm’s notion of dialogue as
“thinking together” both presumes and expands Habermas’s original conception of the
lifeworld as a pool of shared meanings that people draw upon to construct mutual
understanding. Bohm suggests that the lifeworld is a source of meaning that flows
through us in ways we are not always conscious of, but once we suspend the assumptions
that fragment our thinking and our actions, we can reach greater coherence in our
thoughts and actions.
Bakhtin: The Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces of Language
Just as Bohm deepens our understanding of dialogue by revealing the
fragmentation of thought, Bakhtin expands the meaning and role of dialogue by revealing
how fragmented the language itself is that we use when we try to reach mutual
understanding. Where Habermas focuses on the initial claim in a discourse oriented to
validation, Bakhtin places the primacy on the response as the pivotal move of dialogue,
and in so doing begins to de-center the self as the critical agent in the act of dialogue and
makes space for the presence of the other. For Bakhtin, language comes to us with a
socially determined framework:
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Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private
property of the speaker’s intentions; it is populated—overpopulated—with the
intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions
and accents, is a difficult and complicated process. (Bakhtin 1981, 294)
This process is complicated because it means mastering forces that compete with
each other as we communicate. On the one hand are the centripetal or unifying forces of
language:
The firm, stable linguistic nucleus of an officially recognized literary
language…We are taking language not as a system of abstract grammatical
categories, but rather language conceived as ideologically saturated, language as a
world view, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a maximum of mutual
understanding in all spheres of ideological life. (271)
This unified language, or the pull toward it, reduces the degree of difference in
our interpretations, meanings, and understandings exchanged in communication. We rely
on this common framework to make everyday exchanges of familiar linguistic
interactions possible and routine.
On the other hand, language also exists amidst the realities of heteroglossia (428),
the disunifying or centrifugal force of differing meanings, uses, social groups,
generations, and the like. Each word carries with it divergent meanings depending on the
variety of contexts and multiple interpretations it evokes in a particular instance. The
interplay of these two forces makes the act of communicating a dynamic and active
process. Each utterance invites a response, calling each speaker to create a way of
understanding and being present to the meaning that is at play in the moment of
communication:
In the actual life of speech, every concrete act of understanding is active: it
assimilates the word to be understood into its own conceptual system filled with
specific objects and emotional expressions, and is indissolubly merged with the
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response, with a motivated agreement or disagreement. To some extent, primacy
belongs to the response, as the activating principle: it creates the ground for
understanding, it prepares the ground for an active and engaged understanding.
Understanding comes to fruition only in the response. (282)
This “primacy of response” requires a self and other to be truly present in the
moment of acting and responding. There can be no response without the ability to take
the other’s perspective into account, and in that dialogical act of understanding, the first
challenge of pluralism is addressed: the fusion of self and other in an act of understanding
that does not require either party to relinquish his or her unique perspective. Drawing on
Bakhtin, Baxter and Montgomery (1999) explain that
The essence of dialogue is its simultaneous differentiation from yet fusion with
another. To enact dialogue, the parties need to fuse their perspectives while
maintaining the uniqueness of individual perspectives; the parties form a unity in
conversation but only through two clearly differentiated voices. Dialogue, unlike
monologue, is multivocal, that is, it is characterized by the presence of at least
two distinct voices. (24-25)
In contrast to battlefields of warring perspectives that so often characterize
pluralism in the public sphere, Bakhtin argues that in dialogue we experience this
connection of individual perspectives as a “once-occurrent event of Being” (Bakhtin
1993) that happens in the moment of encounter and response between self and other.
Because of the inescapable present-ness of the encounter in dialogue, Bakhtin argues that
each of us is “answerable” for the construction of our lives as a series of once-occurrent
acts. We are there, inescapably present.
In asserting that communication is a concrete act that constructs understanding
between the self and the other, and that this act entails that one take the other into
account, Bakhtin points to critical dimension of dialogue: ethics. But while Bakhtin
points down this the road, his notion of answerability still focuses on the self in the
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dialogical relationship, because while the other calls us forth in response, one could argue
that the myriad shortcomings in Western philosophy that privilege the self over the other
are not fully addressed. Jeffrey Murray argues that if Bakhtin describes the self-Other
relationship from the perspective of the self, it is Levinas who declares the “ethical
imperative” of concern for the Other and that dialogic ethics is the ground of human
existence and “first philosophy” (Murray 2000).
Levinas: Ethics and Responding to the Call of the Other
For Levinas, the call to be ethical—to take responsibility for the Other—emanates
not from the self but from the Other. It is not left up to the self to remember to give the
Other his proper due, or to follow an abstract ethical mandate to do so. Levinas argues
that the concrete presence of the Other—what he terms “the face”—in all of its exposure
and defenselessness is what issues the ethical summons to care and respond. According
to Jovanovic and Wood, “the face, then, is the injunction issued by the other to the self,
insisting and inviting response. This presentation conditions the possibility of discourse”
(Jovanovic and Wood 2004, 319). This sense of responsibility of self for Other is not so
much a response to the content of the call of the Other, or what Levinas calls “the said,”
but is a response to the saying. “The saying, then, is a greeting made before the utterance
of any content, the said. The first move in communication for Levinas is in the approach
to and contact with another, before themes are established, identities confirmed, and
ideologies discovered” (319). Levinas puts it this way:
Saying states and thematizes the said, but signifies it to the other, a neighbor, with
a signification that has to be distinguished from that borne by words in the said.
This signification to the other occurs in proximity. Proximity is quite distinct
from every other relationship, and has to be conceived as a responsibility for the
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other; . . . Nothing is more grave, more august, than responsibility for the other,
and saying, in which there is no play, has a gravity more grave than its own being
or not being (Levinas 1981, 46).
Given this gravity, it appears at first puzzling that Levinas also describes the
relationship of the self and the other as “disinterested.” At first blush, it makes little
sense that we are responsible for, yet disinterested in, the Other. But this is the radical
shift that Levinas proposes, for it is the very “interestedness” of the rational self that leads
to the “me first” attitudes that is at the root of so many of society’s ills:
Being’s interest takes dramatic form in egoisms struggling with one another, each
against all, in the multiplicity of allergic egoisms which are at war with one
another and are thus together. War is the deed or the drama of the essence’s
interest. (4)
In contrast, the disinterested self seeks no space in this struggle of egos, and is not
seeking reward nor is it interested in winning this war. In effect, Levinas is suggesting
that the self we suppose we gain in the “each against all” of egos is, in fact, no self at all.
If the saying, the act of being one for the other, is signification, then for my self to mean
anything at all it must come to mean “me” in the act of being for the other. The call of
the Other gives occasion for me to become the singular, unique self inescapably called
forth from all other selves to be for the Other:
Substitution is signification. Not a reference from one term to another, as it
appears thematized in the said, but substitution as the very subjectivity of a
subject, interruption of the irreversible identity of the essence. It occurs in the
taking charge of, which is incumbent on me without any escape possible. Here
the unicity of the ego first acquires a meaning – where it is no longer a question of
the ego, but of me. The subject which is not an ego, but which I am, cannot be
generalized, is not a subject in general; we have moved from the ego to me who
am me and no one else. There the identity of the subject comes from the
impossibility of escaping responsibility, from the taking charge of the other. (1314)
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Levinas’ conception of the generalized ego being called to a full, unique self
through responsibility to the Other stands in sharp contrast to the solitary individual ego
of COS 2.0. If the secular canopy is captured by Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, then, as we
will see, the civic canopy might be epitomized by Levinas’s après vous.
Admittedly, upon reading Levinas’s unrelenting call to care for the Other, one is
tempted to dismiss his appeal as too extreme, or as one more abstracted ethical
imperative like the daily flood of exhortations in one’s mailbox to give, donate, join.
Levinas is clear that this responsibility does not stem from some abstract moral
imperative that we are obliged out of guilt or fear of retribution to obey, but instead,
My responsibility for the other man, the paradoxical, contradictory responsibility
for a foreign liberty. . .does not originate in a vow to respect the universality of a
principle, nor in a moral imperative. It is the exceptional relation in which the
Same can be concerned with the Other, without the Other’s being assimilated into
the Same, the relation in which one can recognize the inspiration, in the strict
sense of the term, to bestow spirit upon man. (Levinas 2000, 245)
Here Levinas lays out the ground of ethics in dialogue, and how it reframes the
challenge of pluralism we have been addressing throughout. To be responsible for the
Other, not because one wishes to remake the Other in one’s own image but because the
Other calls us to be our full selves, is to transform pluralism from an obstacle to an
invitation; from a lack of sameness to a source of authenticity. For Levinas, plurality is
irreducible, and ethics is manifest in the very relationship of Being and that which is
“otherwise than Being” (Levinas 1981).
Summary
To retrace the steps of this chapter, we began by confronting the challenge that
came with the crisis of COS 2.0—namely, how to respond to a world in which rationality
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had been the cause of such systemic failure rather than a source of liberation from it. We
reviewed Habermas’s attempt to stand in the breach and reclaim reason as a
communicative act that gains its normative and legitimating force by giving all
participants in a discourse the ability to raise and defend validity claims, and to take a
yes/no position toward the claims of others in a non-coercive process oriented toward
mutual understanding. While the “ideal speech situation” that makes it possible for the
unforced force of the better argument to prevail over more instrumental attempts to
influence outcomes is admittedly often counterfactual, Habermas argues that it is
nonetheless presupposed by anyone who seeks to engage others in communication rather
than simply resorting to coercive or even violent means of “getting one’s way.”
The importance of this reformulation of reason cannot be overstated, as it
provides a legitimizing rationale for not only the nonviolent coordination of actions
amongst individuals, but serves as the presumptive rationale for the social “fact” that one
must obey the law and the state—and thus the legitimate use of collective force to ensure
the general welfare—as well as the “norm” that one ought to abide by collectively
reached public decisions because they are ultimately based on reasons that are found to
be compelling by the larger community affected by those decisions. While Habermas
makes no claims that grounding the legitimating force of democracy in a communicative
view of reason will solve all problems, he does at least give us the ability to solve those
problems on fair and legitimate terms and through publically defensible mechanisms.
I then argued that while Habermas staves off the full collapse of COS 2.0 into a
neo-Hobbesian morass of “all against all,” the work of other theorists—namely Bohman,
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Bohm, Bakhtin, and Levinas—fill out a dialogical view of communication that better
explains how it is that people are able, under the right conditions, to not only “remain at
the table” in the face of radically plural notions of the good, true, and beautiful, but even
learn to transcend those differences to construct solutions to problems and new
possibilities for being together that are creative, generative, and transformational. Bohm
helps us see that dialogue is in part a matter of thought, and that our thinking is complicit
in generating the crisis of radical pluralism and our inability to see beyond our
fragmented perceptions. He also opens the door to the possibility that we can transform
our world by reframing our assumptions and learning to see “reality” in new ways by
“thinking with” others in dialogue. Bakhtin makes clear we are dialogically constituted in
language and the once-occurrent act of our Being plays out in communication. That is,
communication is not merely an exchange of “truth claims” about what we take to be
true, but actually helps constitute our construction of what is true, and binds us in a fusion
of meaning with the Other. From Bakhtin we see the possibility that a new, shared
understanding can emerge through dialogue that takes both participants up into a greater
whole that includes the parts they both contributed to its construction. Levinas takes this
relationship with the Other one step farther, and casts dialogue as being One for the
Other, an ethical act that radically reframes the challenge of e pluribus unum from the
possibility of irreducible conflict to an invitation to respond, to care, to be-for-the-Other.
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CHAPTER THREE: COMMUNICATIVE REASON IN COLLABORATION,
COMMUNITY LEARNING, AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Overview
In the previous chapter, I argued that COS 2.0 proved to be too fragmented to
address the societal need for integration and too rigid to handle the increasing complexity
of problems and systems throughout the 20th century, and that a more adequate cultural
operating system would be based in communicative reason, rather than instrumental
reason. To make this case, I relied heavily on theoretical and philosophical justifications.
But since social structures are ultimately borne out in practice, we must now turn our
attention to the literature on practical attempts to solve the challenges of e pluribus unum.
In this chapter, I will explore the conditions under which diverse groups and
organizations have found ways to work effectively as a collective while still honoring the
diversity of their members. Thanks in large part to the important work of researchers
such as Carl Larson, David Chrislip, Darrin Hicks, and others who have studied the
variations in implementation quality of evidence-based, community-level services, we
can say that these favorable conditions comprise an “open and credible process” that has
a strong and direct correlation with the level of impact on community outcomes. I will
then review a number of process models that have proven to be effective at yielding
results in other fields and synthesize their common features into a new community
learning model that enables diverse stakeholder groups to work effectively together,
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irrespective of the particular issue area or context they face. While I believe the model I
introduce here can be justified in part on the merits of the supporting research that
undergirds it, I will also ground the rationale for the model in research from Hicks and
Larson (Hicks et al. 2008). They theorize that the mechanism that explains the
effectiveness of certain groups over time, at least in terms of enabling their faithful
implementation of evidence-based practices, is that the groups ensure the “transfer of
commitment” from initial leaders of the process to those who carry out the actual work
on the ground. While the conditions Hicks and Larson have investigated to develop this
theory are circumscribed and they caution against overgeneralizing from their findings, I
will argue that their findings are in keeping with the general body of both theory and
practical research on the nature of complex adaptive systems. While a full exploration of
complex adaptive systems is beyond both my expertise and the focus of this project, I
will suggest that the broad outlines of effective collaborative groups are at least
consistent with the basic elements of complex adaptive systems theory, and that both
stand in contrast to the closed, formal, rule-based logic of COS 2.0. In the following
chapters, I will then argue that open, network-based models of engagement not only yield
more practical results, but also appear to be the foundation of an emerging COS 3.0 that
is slowly being “installed” through civil society structures and platforms.
E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Unity Within Collaboration
Despite the dour analysis by Putnam and others cited at the outset of this paper in
terms of America’s civic health, especially in our most diverse communities, much has
changed in America over the past four decades that can be considered positive in terms of
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grappling with the challenges of bringing together people with differing worldviews and
interests and finding ways to work together for the good of the community. “Indeed,”
argue Sirianni and Friedland, “over the past several decades [Americans] have created
forms of civic practice that are far more sophisticated in grappling with complex public
problems and collaborating with highly diversified social actors than have ever existed in
American History” (Sirianni and Friedland 2001, 1).
High Quality Processes
Trying to assess the nature and impact of collaborative practices does pose
challenges, since much of the research on collaborative practices remains anecdotal and
inconclusive (Jones, Crook and Webb 2007; Leighninger 2006; Hicks et al. 2008). This
is likely more of a commentary on the early stages of the field’s formation, and thus on
the design of the studies, than on the impact of collaboration itself. According to Glasby
and Dickinson, “most studies focus on issues of process (how well are we working
together?) rather than on outcomes (does it make any difference for people who use
services?)” (Glasby and Dickinson 2008, 1). This is consistent with Ansell and Gash
(2008) who found that most of the 137 cases in their review of collaborative governance
focused on process outcomes as well. This is not surprising, given the various ways
researchers are still coming to conceptualize the actual nature of collaboration. For
instance, in Jones, Crook and Webb’s review of 71 studies related to collaboration, most
of the studies were classified as commentary or conceptualization, with only 22 (30%)
classified as empirical using Klein and Bloom’s (1994) taxonomy, and of those 22, only 8
stated explicit research questions, leading the authors to conclude “the empirical literature
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presented here is largely anecdotal and at the weaker end of a methodological hierarchy,”
making it difficult to draw firm conclusions (Jones, Crook, and Webb 2007, 65). Some
of the studies that have found positive outcomes associated with collaboration attribute
those outcomes to the instrumental benefits of expanded service coverage (Selden, Sowa,
and Sandfort 2006; Der 2009), while others focus on the impact collaboration has on the
quality of relationships and communication amongst participants (Faria et el. 2007;
Walter and Petr 2000; Zwarenstein and Reeves 2006). It is this group of studies that are
most germane to my overall argument and to which we shall turn our attention.
Among the studies that focus on communicative aspects of collaboration, the
work of Carl Larson, David Chrislip and Darrin Hicks shines the brightest light. Chrislip
and Larson (1994) conducted perhaps the first foundational study into the nature and
effects of collaboration on public processes. Commissioned by the American Leadership
Forum to investigate what constituted effective civic leadership, they evaluated over 52
collaborative projects around the country that had successfully addressed complex
situations in their communities. They distilled the essential elements that lay at the heart
of those efforts. From this research emerged what they called “the collaborative
premise:”
If you bring the appropriate people together in constructive ways with good
information, they will create authentic visions and strategies for addressing the
shared concerns of the organization and community. (Chrislip and Larson 1994,
14)
Their study was the first of its kind, providing a broad scan of public processes
from around the country and laid the foundation for much of what would follow in the
field of researching effective practices in collaboration. In their study, Chrislip and
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Larson offered some preliminary conclusions about what it takes to make collaboration
succeed. These include:
•

Good timing and a clear need

•

Strong stakeholder groups

•

Broad-based involvement

•

Credibility and openness of process

•

Commitment and/or involvement of high-level, visible leaders

•

Support or acquiescence of “established” authorities or powers

•

Overcoming mistrust and skepticism

•

Strong leadership of the process

•

Interim successes

•

A shift to broader concerns (Chrislip and Larson 1994, 52-54)

From this list, two qualities that all 52 sites had in common were strong process
leadership, and an open, credible process (Hicks et al. 2008). Based on this framework,
Larson, Hicks and their colleagues began to evaluate the correlations between the level of
process quality and the outcomes that similarly situated projects achieved. In a study of
Colorado Healthy Communities Initiative ten years after the program was initiated, they
explored how the 26 original sites rated in terms of both their process quality and
outcomes. They found that 19 of the original 26 sites involved with the project were still
in operation. For process quality, they used interviews with original participants to
determine an aggregate score for each site in terms of how well it demonstrated an open
and credible process, defined operationally in the following manner:
•

The process was free of favoritism
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•

The people were focused on broad goals, rather than individual agendas

•

Decisions made in the process were based on fair criteria

•

Everyone had an equal opportunity to influence decisions

•

There was sufficient opportunity to challenge decisions (Larson et al.
2002)

They then assessed each site in terms of how the outcomes it produced, with each
site getting a score of 1-6 depending on how it was rated by participants and interviewers
on the following scale:
1. The project accomplished its specific objectives.
2. The project achieved more than its original goals.
3. The project had a concrete impact on the root problem it targeted.
4. The project led to other projects or efforts.
5. The project helped change the way the community works together on
public issues.
6. The project led to some individuals becoming new leaders or to more
engaged community members (Larson et al. 2002, 5-6).
The overall correlation between process quality and success was +.71 based on
participant ratings and +.81 based on interviewer rating, demonstrating a strong
correlation between the two. Even more dramatic are the findings summarized in Table 1
that show the relationship between process quality and success when comparing the
active and inactive groups. As the authors note, “the correlations between sustainability
and success are sufficiently strong that they may be, for all practical purposes, the same
thing” (24). The high levels of statistical significance in these findings suggest that at
57

least in this instance, process quality relates strongly and directly to success and
sustainability of a collaborative effort—even 10 years after its inception.
Table 1: Significance Test of Comparison of Active and Inactive CHCI Sites (Larson et al. 2002, 24)

Rating (Scale = 1-6)
Mean process
Quality rating
Overall success
rating
Participant’s success
score

Active Sites (n=19)
5.05

Inactive Sites (n=7)
3.43

p Value
p<.000003

5.21

2.57

p<.000002

5.16

2.29

p<.000001

A second study that links process quality and community impact was based on the
16 sites in Colorado that implemented the Nurse Family Partnership (NFP) home
visitation model between 1999 and 2003. The NFP is an evidence-based model that has a
nurse visit an expecting mother weekly during pregnancy and then up to the child’s
second birthday. With over 20 years of longitudinal research the demonstrate the
program’s effectiveness for children whose mothers complete the program, the key
variable then becomes completion rates for mothers. To determine the possible causes
for the variance in attrition rates of mothers across sites, Hicks and Larson looked at a
number of individual level variables (Level 1) that seemed likely correlates: the level of
education of the mother (education), the mother’s mastery score taken upon entry into the
program (mastery), number of visits completed during pregnancy (nurse visits), and the
attrition rates of nurses (attrition). In addition, they looked at one site level (Level 2)
variable: process quality (authenticity), as measured by survey questions related to
credible and open the community process was that was used to adopt the program. Using
a hierarchical generalized linear model (HGLM) to analyze the results, they could explain
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10.2% of the variation in the mothers’ attrition rates based on Level 1 variables, and an
additional 12.6% of the variation when they looked at the Level 2 variable of process
quality. In commenting on their findings, the authors noted that
The most striking thing about the results is not simply that the hypothesis [that
process quality would account for a significant proportion of the variance in
attrition] is supported but rather it is the strength of the association found between
process quality and participant attrition. . . One additional fact makes the finding
in the present research even more surprising: Site-level data on process quality
was collected approximately 4 years before the programmatic data on attrition
were collected. (Hicks et al. 2008, 469-70)
These finds are supported in other studies. Gomez, Greenberg and Feinberg
(2005) concur that the internal functioning of the community coalition board—e.g.
quality of communication, level of support, and level of motivation—in the early stages
of the coalition work played a significant role in determining the sustainability of the
Communities that Care coalitions in Pennsylvania three years after inception.
Transfer of Commitment
From this research we see that the importance of the early stages of a
collaborative process cannot be overstated. As we have seen, establishing what
researchers call the “virtuous cycle” of trust and commitment early on greatly affects the
likelihood of long-term success and sustainability (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). But
understanding that it is critical is one thing; understanding how it is established is another
thing altogether. For this, lessons learned from game theory as it is modeled in computer
generated simulations of complex network interactions proves particularly helpful.
Johnston et al. explain (2010) this in terms of the “minimum effort game,” which, like the
Prisoners Dilemma, simulates the basic risk and reward structure of situations where
multiple actors must work together. In this game, the theoretical group is building a
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chain, and each person can either contribute a strong or weak link to the chain. They can
spend $1 to contribute a weak link, or $10 to contribute a strong link. If all contribute a
strong chain, the payoff is $30 for everyone; if anyone contributes a weak link, the payoff
is $4. Played amongst random strangers where there is no established pattern of others
contributing a strong link, the game defaults to an equilibrium of each person
contributing a weak link. However,
when entering into a situation where everyone is contributing a strong link, there
is no incentive to ‘game the system’ and not cooperate. Articulation of
collaborative governance in a game theoretic framework provides some
understanding about the robustness of early interactions to outcomes found years
later in the [Nurse Family Partnership research (Hicks et al. 2008)] (Johnston et
al. 2010, 11).
Hicks et al. (2008) call this “fundamental pattern of a learned level of cooperation
among people the ‘transfer of commitment’” (472). On this account, the commitment of
the initial members of a group to work for the good of the group, rather than just for their
own individual gain, overcomes the initial risk of collaboration and infuses the process
with new type of energy that not only reinforces their own virtuous cycle of trust and
further commitment, but is passed down through successive interactions with others who
join the process at later stages. This hinges in part on the importance of attracting others
who are committed to the process, “providing a proactive response to emerging
problems,” and “making concerted efforts to retain key individuals who are deeply
committed to the program” and keep them engaged (472). This passing on of
commitment is not just “strategic” in the sense that it is an intention played out over time;
it is palpably present, and sends signals to others present in a group in a concrete,
experiential manner. This is consistent with LaFasto and Larson’s (2001) research on
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effective teams, and how they create and sustain mental, physical, and emotional energies
that “spread through teams to produce outcomes which go beyond performance
expectations one would have of individual team members” (Hicks et al. 2008, 472). It
also reinforces the notion proposed by Bohm (1996) and explained by Isaacs (1999)
referenced earlier that groups form “fields” as they work together in which energy
actually changes states and has demonstrable effects. The implications of this finding,
while admittedly at odds with the subjected-centered, individualistic assumptions of
COS 2.0, will prove critical to explaining and understanding the emerging structure of
COS 3.0. If we take these implications seriously, the whole challenge of e pluribus unum
that we have been taking as a given—of balancing part and whole, individual and
collective—begins to reveal itself as an example of Bohm’s “fragmented thought” that
causes negative patterns of behavior and then pretends “it didn’t do it.” If individuals
give and take energy within groups, as this research suggests, then the models of effective
group interaction begin to look more like the natural systems we mentioned at the outset,
where the part and whole do not constitute a problem to be solved so much as an
irreducible element of the ecosystem itself. Everything is at once both part and whole, or
what Arthur Koestler termed a “holon” (Koestler 1967). A cell is a whole in that it is
made up of molecules, and yet it is a part of an organism. The same relationship abides
between the molecule and atoms, atoms and subatomic particles, and all the way down to
the quantum level, and all the way up to from organisms to ecosystems and on up to solar
systems, galaxies, and beyond. Koestler called the organization of holons into successive
levels of increasing complexity and order “holarchy.” We will return to this concept in a
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moment when we look to the question of the social organization at the level of civil
society, but for now, it is important to note that the more one peers into the research on
the effective interaction amongst diverse groups of people, the more the patterns
highlight a shift away from the foundations of COS 2.0 and begin to reveal the
architecture of COS 3.0.
Cautions and Limitations of Research on Collaboration
While the research I have cited here is both solid and encouraging, it is admittedly
limited in many ways. First, the sample sizes are small and not particularly generalizable
given the nature of their designs. Second, I have focused on a narrow slice of an already
small body of research, and have left unexplored the more subtle distinctions between
collaborative work, and its close cousins of cooperation and coordination (Mattessich and
Monsey 1992). Nor have we looked at examples where collaboration has proven to be
ineffective, or misapplied to the situation (Larson and Hicks 2004). These are important
issues and provide a necessary caution against the temptation to extrapolate from the
findings cited here to reach the unwarranted conclusion that collaboration is a cure all for
any situation in which diverse actors find themselves in joint activity. That is certainly
not the case. What I have tried to do is inquire into those situations in which, despite the
prevailing wisdom of COS 2.0, which places an emphasis on the rational individual
maximizing his or her choices within a set of systems that encourage and protect
individuals to pursue their individual goods, we have found not only successful examples
where collaborative activity demonstrates the theoretical model of communicative reason
outlined in Chapter 2, but even more, the lessons gleaned from such examples generate a
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useful model for explaining how it is that such behavior sets in motion the conditions for
ripples of impact that produce positive effects years into the future.
Summary
Though the research cited here is admittedly in the nascent stages of mapping the
true contours of the landscape of collaboration, the evidence is strong enough to suggest
that the quality of the communicative processes involved in collaborative work have an
important and lasting effect on outcomes of collective work. Further, based on the work
of Larson, Hicks, and Chrislip, we can say with increasing confidence what the specific
elements of high quality processes are and how they can be accurately assessed by
participants in those processes. These findings, while limited in scope, lend credible,
empirical evidence to the theoretical claims we explored in Chapter Two. First,
communicative reason, as outlined by Habermas and refined by a number of respondents,
suggests that all competent language users possess the ability to draw upon
communicative reason as a non-coercive means of coordinating joint activity through
mutual understanding and the “unforced force of the better argument,” rather than
presuming that such coordination of joint activity is only brought about through steering
mechanisms rooted in instrumental rationality. That outcomes varied in the examples
studied in direct relation to the degree participants believed they could fairly influence
the outcomes of process through their input, which is a hallmark of communicative
reason, suggests collaboration depends on the exercise of communicative reason rather
than on more instrumental means of influence. Further, the findings we reviewed suggest
that our more “dialogical correction” of Habermas’s original theory is warranted to the
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degree the researchers’ explanation of the effects suggests that the process of
collaboration hinges on more than simply joint decision-making and “the exchange of
reasons,” but also includes the relational quality of the group and the commitment to
others in the group. Such findings are in keeping with Bakhtin’s emphasis that
communication is “once-occurrent” and experiential, and while the research we have
reviewed thus far does not speak to the actual nature of the group’s discourse, the effects
of their communication are consistent with Bohm’s notion that in dialogue, groups learn
to “think together” as they form more coherent “fields” of communication that resemble
phase shifts in nature. Finally, Levinas’ emphasis on the ethical dimension of
communication as “being for the Other” is a plausible description of how the “virtuous
cycle” of collaboration and trust is at least partially set in motion through the cues that
members send to each other that they are concerned about more than simply securing
their own gain or advancing vested interests.
Learning From and In Other Fields
While the research on collaboration reviewed above provides a powerful model
that confirms that the quality of a group’s efforts has a lot to do with the quality of its
process, a review of different models for creating those conditions reveals a wealth of
effective strategies for ensuring the success of groups working in a range of contexts
toward a variety of goals. By looking to a number of successful models for engaging
citizens in improving the quality of their communities, we can see the “family
resemblance” between a number of these models. In what follows, I will briefly
summarize five different examples from the literature on group effectiveness that meet
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criteria that are relevant for our overall project, including a) applying to diverse sets of
stakeholders, b) showing evidence of effectiveness in terms of process and outcomes, and
c) applying to public problems of general concern. After reviewing these examples, I
will then offer a synthesis of their most salient qualities to form what we might call a
“community learning model.” This model is designed to help diverse members of a
community intentionally create the conditions for defining common outcomes, working
effectively towards them, and adapting and sustaining their efforts over time.
Learning Organizations
Any survey of models for improving the collective performance of groups should
rightfully include at least some reference to notions of continuous improvement models
given the widespread and international interest in the topic. The challenge is deciding on
what to call them. “Quality circles” were among the earliest ancestors of this family,
popularized in large part through the example of Japan’s rise on the global stage after
WWII and the celebrity W. Edwards Deming earned with the successful turnaround of
Ford Motor Company (Deming 1986). Quality circles were applied primarily to industry
but to other fields as well in the 1970s and 80s, and then blurred into other forms of
quality improvement—Total Quality Management (TQM), Six Sigma methods, Malcolm
Baldridge Excellence Awards, EFQM, and other models (Dahlgaard 1999). While some
research on the effectiveness of the early quality circle movement cites solid support for
the effectiveness of quality circles (Barrick and Alexander 1986), other reviews have
found the increasingly faddish nature of the phenomenon has dissipated its effects (Hill
1991). Still, the basic features of the quality circles, or quality control circles (QCC) as
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they were originally called in Japan (Lillrank and Kano 1989), are consistent with the
features of other small group, quality improvement models in other fields and disciplines,
sometimes called “learning communities” or “communities of practice,” that have proven
effective at generating results in education, health care, and other service industries
(Schmoker, 2002; McLaughlin and Talbert 2001; Wenger 1996; Hemmasi and Csanda
2009). Though not an exact match, and derived from different theoretical models, these
variants can to a certain degree be classified under what has come to be known as
“learning organizations” (Senge 1990; Garvin, Edmondson and Gino 2008). In general
terms these models share some basic elements:
•

They include a structured learning cycle (e.g. Plan→Act→Study→Do) that is
iterative and continuous

•

They use data on important outcomes as an important feedback loop to inform
decisions

•

They frequently consist of small, voluntary groups of practitioners committed
to learning from each other and improving practice

•

They place an emphasis on the relationships and culture among members as
well as on results of their work

•

They emphasize process improvement as a key mechanism for quality
improvement
Civic Innovation and Civic Renewal

In the late 1990s, Sirianni and Friedland began writing a book about participation
and democracy from a cross-cultural, primarily European perspective but were so taken
by the recent civic innovations in the United States that they jettisoned their initial project
and focused entirely on gathering the lessons learned by activists, theorists, professional
practitioners in nonprofits and government agencies, and even some corporate
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organizations eager to find new ways to engage and develop partnerships with citizens
(Sirianni and Friedland 2001, ix). They frame the notion of civic innovation not just as a
list of best practices; rather, they frame the concept as a type of social learning, where
practices that have been effective at producing social change are adapted over time to
expand their effectiveness. For instance, in their interviews with hundreds of civic
innovators, Sirianni and Friedland spoke with many of the leaders of social movements
and civic engagement efforts from the 1960s who have remained engaged in work of
participatory processes. Among the changes that these innovators identified is that they
“place much greater emphasis upon building relationships of trust with diverse
stakeholders and adversaries and much less upon personalized fulfillment or intense and
ideologically pure identity-forming activities” (27). The continual refinement and
application of core principles to actual practice is at the heart of effective civic
involvement. Civic innovation also strengthens the ties that bind us to one another,
heightening the stores of social capital in the process:
[Civic innovation] mobilizes social capital in ways that promote broad democratic
norms, enhance responsible and inclusive citizenship, and build the civic
capacities of communities and institutions to solve problems through the public
work of citizens themselves, often in collaboration with various market, state, and
professional actors and through policy designs that foster self-government. (14)
Sirianni and Friedland look at a number of examples of how this is being
accomplished, from stories of community organizers, to civic environmentalists, to
community health advocates, and finally public journalists. Rather than approaching
their task as a matter of analyzing specific “civic methods” and evaluating their impact to
see which were more effective, they approached their work through a participatory
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research model of documenting and encouraging innovation in each field (30). In the
essence, they were tracing the particular ways civic innovation occurred in different
fields since the birth of more participatory forms of democracy in the 1960s.
While their work is more narrative than analytical, it is possible to distill from
their stories a handful of principles that will serve our current project’s goals of
understanding the best lessons from the field of civic engagement. The short version of
that distillation is that civic innovation involves:
•

Connecting citizens to public life

•

Mobilizing social capital to generate new institutional forms, supported by
public policy, that solves community problems

•

Social learning through policy, organizational development and regulatory
culture, and participatory democratic theory

It is important to note that one of the other conclusions that Sirianni and Friedland
offered at the time of their writing was that with all of the momentum around civic
innovation, a new movement was building across the country—the civic renewal
movement. They imagined the many forces they described in the book as about to
converge to create a new social movement that would usher in a substantial reframing of
the role of citizen from passive consumer to active problem solver, and the role of
government from dispenser of services to “‘catalyst’ for citizen problem solving and a
‘partner’ in multi-sided collaborative efforts” (242). Central to this movement would be
a rebirth of civil society—a notion we will pick up in a moment.
Democratic Governance
In The Next Form of Democracy, Leighninger outlines the lessons learned from
the public sector’s attempts to engage citizens more directly in governance. Distilling the
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principles at play in successful efforts across the country, he summarizes their
commonalities:
First, they recruit people by reaching out through the various groups and
organizations to which they belong, in order to assemble a large and diverse
‘critical mass’ of citizens. Second, they involve those citizens in combination of
small- and large-group meetings; structured, facilitated small groups for informed,
deliberative dialogue, and large forums for amplifying shared conclusions and
moving from talk to action. Third, they give the participants in these meetings the
opportunity to compare values and experiences, and to consider a range of views
and policy options. Finally, they effect change in a number of ways: by applying
citizen input to policy and planning decisions, by encouraging change within
organizations and institutions, by creating teams to work on particular action
ideas, by inspiring and connecting individual ideas, or all of the above
(Leigninger 2006, 3)
We might summarize Leighninger’s principles this way:
•

Recruit a diverse critical mass

•

Facilitate small and large group dialogue

•

Compare values, consider options

•

Take action by changing policies, organizations, and communities.

Among the examples Leighninger cites are communities who faced the challenge
of declining tax revenues and increased demand for services, dealing with racial strife in
public affairs, and revitalizing decaying neighborhoods. In all of these examples,
communities successfully relied upon the same basic principles of engagement,
deliberation, shared decision making, and action planning to more effectively address
perennial problems.
Civic Engagement
In New Laboratories for Democracy: How Local Government is Reinventing
Civic Engagement, Mike McGrath from the National Civic League recounts four specific
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innovations that local governments are using to inspire and empower citizens to better
solve their own problems and act as partners with, rather than consumers of, local
government services (McGrath 2010). McGrath identifies the following practices as
central to reinventing civic engagement:
•

Experiments that equalize engagement across the citizenry as part of ensuring
that diverse voices are heard, rather than providing a platform for
"professional citizens" alone;

•

New programs that resolve long-standing problems and address pressing
neighborhood needs by leveraging community assets and knowledge;

•

Temporary planning and decision-making forums that go beyond community
meetings and public hearings, as part of building support for difficult
decisions; and

•

Government-citizen efforts that harness technology for gathering real-time
data for program decision making and day-to-day program management.
Effective Teams

LaFasto and Larson (2001) have spent nearly 30 years tracking the performance
of 6,000 team members and leaders representing some of the highest performing teams in
the world from across a wide range of industries. Using observations, interviews and
survey data, they developed a model to explain and assess what differentiates highperforming from lower-performing teams. Their model is a set of nested relationships
that are distinct but interdependent, with each having a set of core components that are
pivotal in discriminating between levels of performance. These include:
•

Team Members: Core competency, supportiveness, an action orientation, and
a positive personal style

•

Team Relationships: The ability to give and receive feedback

•

Team Problem Solving: Focus, positive climate, open communication
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•

Team Leadership: Focus on the goal, ensure collaborative climate, build
confidence, demonstrate sufficient technical know-how, set priorities, manage
performance

•

Team Environment: Effective management practices, decision-making
structures and processes, and information systems that drive results
Synthesis

When one seeks to compare these different research findings using the lexicon of
features, steps, and elements unique to each model, only a handful of features stand out as
applying to a wide cross-section of models (see Appendix A for a detailed comparison).
However, if we attempt to not just distill a list based on the self-description of each
approach, but to divide these features into “process” and “content” dimensions, then the
features across models can be nested more easily within common themes. For instance, if
we take the general process features from the research on collaboration (Chrislip and
Larson 1994; Ansell and Gash 2008) and learning organizations research (Schmoker,
2002; McLaughlin and Talbert 2001; Wenger 1996; Lillbank and Kano 1989), what
emerges is a basic framework of an ongoing cycle of “plan, act, reflect” that is a source
of learning and adaptation, as well as necessary for building trust and collaboration
amongst participants. Reviewing the content themes, the most common features of all
models are the importance of including diverse participants and the need for a
goal/problem focus. The other element found across multiple models is dialogue and
deliberation, which are referenced as explicit elements of several models and as key
ingredients of others (e.g weighing of options, influencing decisions, etc.).
This analysis, plus the experiences of actually using various process models in the
field with my colleague Drew O’Connor, leads me to offer the following model as an
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attempt to synthesize both the processes and content components of these various bodies
of evidence:
•

Include: make sure a diverse and representative set of stakeholders is
involved in the discussion and decision-making process.

•

Dialogue: create space for the exchange of perspectives and reasons among
equals in the process and for developing decisions and plans for action.

•

Results: develop shared goals and ways to measure impact.

•

Act: make sure that conversations are translated into meaningful action steps
that encourage collaboration and show participants that they can meaningfully
impact outcomes.

•

Learn: revise the process in a transparent manner based on lessons learned,
and adapt strategies to better reach the goals.

•

Create a culture of ongoing trust and collaboration: keep the diverse
partners at the table for the long-haul to continue to work through differences
and monitor progress.
Summary

In this chapter I have tried to make the case that a review of the literature on
effective collaborative processes that have shown evidence of producing high levels of
impact at the community level, and which are manifestations of the communicative
reason we explored in Chapter Two, leads to the development of a “community learning
model” that is applicable to diverse groups working across issues areas and at various
levels of engagement in the community. I have argued further that this model functions
as a vehicle to inspire an ongoing, adaptive learning process within a community that
serves as an “upward spiral” of engagement that manifests the properties of what I am
calling COS 3.0—a new cultural operating system that more adequately addresses the
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challenges of e pluribus unum that ultimately render COS 2.0 ineffective—namely, the
challenges of fragmentation and rigidity in the face of increasing societal complexity.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE COMMUNITY LEARNING MODEL IN PRACTICE
Introduction
The community learning model proposed in the previous chapter is a concrete
response to the practical challenge of helping groups of diverse partners overcome the
challenges of e pluribus unum to collaborate toward greater collective impact. In what
follows, I will explore the model in greater detail and unpack its various stages and
dimensions to explain the rationale behind each. In addition, I will attempt to link to
specific methods and practices to each stage to highlight what it looks like in practice.
Then I will explore this community learning model through the lens of case studies at the
neighborhood, community, and statewide level, and use the lessons gleaned from these
experiences to posit the “design specifications” for building a community-level version of
COS 3.0. These design specifications set the parameters that such an approach must
work within in order to successfully support a new way for community partners to work
together to address complex social problems on community-wide scale.
Unpacking the Community Learning Model
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When taking a closer look at the elements of the community learning model, we
see that it is built from not only the broad elements of effective practice, but it also
includes a more refined set of specific strategies

Figure 2: Community Learning Model

and mechanisms associated with the improved
results. Further, these elements are practical
manifestations of the theory of communicative
action explored in Chapter Two. Taken together
as a whole, these elements can be fruitfully
considered steps in a continuous process of
adaptive learning as depicted in Figure 2. In
addition, each element can also be seen as permeating the others. For instance, while
inclusion is a critical step in the initial establishment of a process, it is also an element of
each meeting of a group and a tone set throughout an entire process. Similarly, the
culture of collaboration is not simply a final stage in a collaborative process, but
something that builds throughout and in turn “holds” the rest of the elements together
with greater intensity and integrity as the culture grows stronger. Figure 3 summarizes a
brief outline of elements within each component. In explaining them, I will use each
element as a type of “regulating ideal,” rather than trying to address all the obstacles and
barriers that might arise as one moves through the process. We will visit the challenges
to each stage when we explore the cases studies later in the chapter.
Critical Outcome
Key Theory/Strategy
Establishing a Collaborative Process
o Assessing and addressing the context
o Ansell and Gash; Chrislip
for collaboration
o Chrislip
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o Ensure facilitative leadership
o Establish the credibility to convene
o Establish trust and conditions for
effective communication
o Build commitment
o Establish legitimacy
o Establish the primacy of mutual
understanding
o Utilize the give and take of reasons
o Reach reasoned decisions and
agreements

o Chrislip and Larson; Ansell and Gash
o Chrislip
Inclusion
o Chrislip and Larson; Levinas,
Habermas
o Johnston et al.
o Chrislip and Larson; Habermas
Dialogue
o Bakhtin; Habermas
o Bohman; Habermas
o Bohman; Habermas; LaFasto and
Larson
Results

o Establish clear and elevating goals
o Use data and feedback loops to inform
decisions
o Develop an action orientation
o Institute effective problem solving
processes
o Maximize innovation, reinforce what
works
o Establish interim successes
o
o
o
o
o

o LaFasto and Larson
o LaFasto and Larson
Act
o LaFasto and Larson
o LaFasto and Larson
o Chrislip and Larson

o LaFasto and Larson
Learn
Establish concrete learning processes
o Garvin; Senge
Establish a safe climate for learning
o Garvin; Senge; LaFasto and Larson
Review and adapt performance
o LaFasto and Larson
Culture of Collaboration
Reinforce climate of trust
o LaFasto and Larson; Hicks and
Larson
Communicate results to include others
o Johnston et al.

Figure 3: Elements of the Community Learning Model
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Establishing a Collaborative Process
Though not technically a part of the model proper, the stage of establishing and
designing the collaborative process is of critical importance to the model’s success
(Ansell and Gash 2008; Chrislip 2002). Given the link we have already explored
between the early stages of the collaborative process and the long term success, starting a
process off on the right foot is paramount. According to Ansell and Gash (2008), the
critical components of this stage are assessing and addressing the starting conditions of
collaboration: potential asymmetries in power, resources, and knowledge among
participants; the incentives for and constraints on participation, and the prehistory of
collaboration or conflict in the group—that is, their baseline level of trust. They also
acknowledge the key role of facilitative leadership, both within the process and in support
of its outcomes. Finally, the highlight the clarifying what they call the “institutional
design” that will determine a number of key features: who should take part, what the
ground rules are, how decisions will be made, and how information will be shared
internally and externally. In his Collaborative Leadership Fieldbook, Chrislip (2002)
reinforces these same elements as a process of “getting started” and “setting up for
success” (94). One minor difference between their two models is that while both
emphasize the need for legitimacy, which is largely a function of the next stage of
Inclusion, Ansell and Gash’s model of collaborative governance gives a central role of
state actors and agencies, which bring with them a presumptive “credibility to convene”
(Chrislip 2002, 76), whereas Chrislip makes that a more formal step for multi-stakeholder
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processes that might need to be more explicit in order to ensure that their work will be
perceived as legitimate by important players potentially affected by the effort.
Include
The importance of legitimacy in a process—that is, those affected by decisions
should have a say in those decisions—runs through both the theoretical arguments
explored here (Habermas 1973b, 1987, 1996) as well as the practical examples (Chrislip
and Larson 1994; Martin, Tett, and Kay 1999; Reilly 1998). A chief strategy for ensuring
legitimacy is including a credible set of stakeholders that “reflects the diversity of the
broader community or region” (Chrislip 2002, 77). These stakeholders should possesses
both a diverse enough set of perspectives to generate novel solutions as well as the
potential to hold public officials and decision-making bodies to account for implementing
the recommendations of the process. While this would appear to suggest that “more
inclusion is better, “ as Johnston et al. (2010) point out, there are often costs associated
with seeking to include too many people too fast in a collaborative process. “How to
thoughtfully navigate the competing tension between inclusion speed and process
commitment, particularly in the early stages of collaboration, is a choice with serious
consequences” (3). Johnston el al. suggest two approaches to inclusion that help address
the tension between speed and process commitment. These approaches are derived from
an analysis of the effective community processes used by Invest in Kids, a Denver-based
nonprofit, to engage stakeholders in decision-making around the selection of the Nurse
Family Partnership model—a nationally recognized “blueprint” prevention model
(Mihalic and Irwin 2003). The first practice associated with successfully balancing these
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tensions is what they call a deliberative planning process, in which the process of
developing consensus and support for the program before moving from the planning
stage to the implementation stage was given the time it needed to develop, rather than
proceeding according to an externally driven schedule. This second practice identified as
effective was what they called the thoughtful inclusion approach. Here, instead of just
having new members show up to a meeting confused about the purpose of the group and
their role in it, new members are given a thoughtful orientation and provided background
in advance. Additionally, new participants are identified in part because of their past
commitment to collaborations, which “added new perspectives and energy to the group”
(8). Both strategies illustrate the importance in the Inclusion stage of intentionally
building strategies that promote legitimacy and the inclusion of diverse partners, but in a
way that builds on, rather than reduces, the overall level of commitment that a core group
might have established.
Dialogue
As we explored in detail in Chapter Two, dialogue is way of thinking,
communicating, and relating with others that enables the open exchange of ideas oriented
toward mutual understanding and which is rooted in an ethical response to the Other. As
participants engage in the initial stages of dialogue, they surface their current
assumptions and the “mental models” (Senge 1990) they hold about the topic at hand,
which allows them to both share their perspectives and to allow those perspectives to be
transformed by the responses of others. As people develop the skills of listening,
speaking, surfacing assumptions, and respecting the ideas of others (Isaacs 1999), they
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create the creative space for a deeper understanding of the issues at hand and of the other
people in the process. Once people learn that mutual understanding is the goal of the
exchanges, rather than needing to convince or convert someone or to fend off others’
attempts at the same, the tone of a group can shift dramatically and people become less
defensive and more open to new ideas. When ideas differ, and compete for the more
accurate account or the more persuasive presentation, the experience of “the unforced
force of the better argument” described by Habermas is palpable—no coercion, just the
exchange of reasons. Admittedly, this is a rare experience for most groups, but Bohman
(2000) lists a number of important mechanisms that promote the give and take of reasons
in dialogue that are familiar to most people and which can provide a useful set of “tools”
for people to draw upon. In addition to the testing and surfacing of assumptions, he
emphasizes the importance of sharing stories and biographical information; moving back
and forth from the specific to the general in one’s argument; articulating from the vague
to the specific; and perspective taking, or seeking to take the position of one’s fellow
discussants and vice versa to better appreciate the nature of their positions. Drawing
upon these dialogical mechanisms in both small and large group settings is critical to
balance the need for individuals to “find their voice” in safety, but also for “amplifying
shared conclusions and moving from talk to action” (Leighninger 2006, 3). With
practice, it becomes easier for groups to reach agreement on their common goals, on the
nature of the problems they face, and on the best path to get there. A key element of the
dialogue stage of the process is to agree upon where the group is headed, and how it will
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get there. Making those decisions within the context of respectful dialogue, rather than
within a polarized atmosphere, is often the difference between success and failure.
Results
At the center of any successful collective endeavor resides a clear articulation of
the results the group seeks—the goal or goals it has in mind and towards which it is
working. While these are not always known in detail at the outset, they must at least
emerge with increasing clarity and power over time. Those desired results and the reassessment of them drive the planning process, the feedback loops of improvement, and
provide the shared “currency” to keep the flow of understanding and shared commitment
alive. In their work tracking 6,000 team members and leaders over time, LaFasto and
Larson (2001) discovered that
The single most important determinant of a team’s success is a ‘clear and
elevating goal.’ We came to this conclusion after talking to members and leaders
of some of the most successful teams in recent history—heart transplant teams,
mountaineering teams, space exploration teams, new product development teams.
Others who have studied groups and teams have reached the same conclusion
with a consistency that approximates consensus. The goal is what it’s all about; it
is the reason the team exists. (72)
Equally important is some way to know, without ambiguity, if the goal is being
reached or not at any given moment. Often this involves determining indicators of
success that are quantifiable, that provide telling pieces of information about the issues
that matter most to the group, but they need not always be quantitative. As Jim Collins
(2005) points out, work that benefits the public good sometimes involves goals that are
initially seem intangible, or which might not show signs of progress for years. So as a
result, measuring progress is more about finding clear “evidence of success” than just
relying on the more obvious numbers and statistics. For a symphony, that may come as
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much from the number of standing ovations as it is from ticket sales; for a community
tackling crime, it may be an increase in the number of first names neighbors know on
their block before it turns into a reduction of burglary. The key is meaning and clarity—
goals have to be compelling, and indicators of progress have to clear so they can set in
motion the feedback loops people need to improve their efforts.
Act
As Chrislip and Larson (1994) point out, “getting results is too often where
collaborative efforts fail. Agreements reached about vision, problem definition, and
solutions are not followed by well-organized, well-managed approaches to
implementation and action” (121). Sometimes this occurs because the problems appear
too complex, and the decision about what to do first feels overwhelming. Effective teams
counter this tendency by developing an “action orientation” (LaFasto and Larson 2001)
that promotes the habit of taking action, even in small ways. As they quip, “the
fundamental law of success is this: Action is more likely to succeed than inaction” (22,
emphasis in the original). Action keeps the ongoing learning cycle in motion, which can
bring with it its own momentum. Communities that have successfully solved problems
over time often need to break well-established patterns and habits, and develop the
capacity for social innovation by paying attention to what has not been working in the
past in order to adapt and try new possibilities (Sirianni and Friedland 2001). At other
times, moving to action does not entail an entirely new effort, but as McGrath points out,
it can be a matter of reinforcing efforts already under way, and finding ways to leverage
existing assets more effectively (McGrath 2010). In addition, Leighninger (2006)
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recommends that groups be mindful of the many arenas for action they have, including
policy change, changing institutions, taking direct action in small groups, or even just
inspiring new ideas and new ways of seeing the world around them. When new actions
must be taken, it is critical that the group has clear decision-making roles and processes,
and can reach agreement on the best action even where there is not unanimity.
Learn
As critical as every element of this learning model may be, perhaps the most
decisive feature that differentiates ongoing action from actual improvement is the degree
to which the actions combine to produce learning and change of practice. As Edmondson
(2008) notes,
Having studied knowledge organizations – hospitals, in particular – for nearly
20 years, I’d like to offer a new definition of what successful execution looks like
in the knowledge economy: The best organizations have figured out how to learn
quickly while maintaining high quality standards. (62)
According to Garvin, Edmondson and Gino (2008), the building blocks of
learning organization include a supportive learning environment, concrete learning
processes and practices, and leadership that supports learning. This is consistent with
LaFasto and Larson’s (2001) findings on the importance of establishing a supportive
climate, the giving and receiving of feedback, and aligning systems to support results.
When groups have both a climate that is supportive and trusting, and the structures to
support learning—e.g. clear and measurable goals with information about progress and
concrete ways to review their performance toward their goals—they can not only better
address the problems they face, but they are also inoculated against the “blame game”
when things do not go right. Rather than seeing different people as scapegoats, groups
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and communities that focus on learning adapt, respond, and improve. This has proven to
be critical in the Grand Junction healthcare success store cited earlier.
The need for having a reliable information system in the community that allows
physicians to actually see their cost and quality data cannot be overstated. In
Grand Junction, the local health plan helped pay for the cost of setting up disease
registries in our practices. These systems allow us to track key indicators for
conditions such as diabetes and asthma and help us better manage the care of
patients with these conditions, which in turn reduces unnecessary hospital
admissions. The data also allow our physicians to see how their performance
compares with that of their peers, which is a powerful motivator. The IPA
[Independent Physicians Association] has also used an incentive pool of funds
provided by the health plan to reward different physician behaviors, depending on
clinical priorities. We have never known for sure whether the money or the desire
to not be at the bottom of the list is the more effective incentive. (Shenkel and
West 2010, 19)
Culture of Collaboration
As we saw in reviewing the research on collaboration above, and as most of our
process models point out (LaFasto and Larson 2001; Garvin, Edmondson and Gino 2008;
Johnston et al. 2010; McGrath 2010; Isaacs 1999; Bohm 1996), building an atmosphere
or “container” of trust and commitment is an imperative for the success and sustainability
of collaborative groups. Such a culture changes the calculus of collaboration (Johnston
et al. 2010) such that new members see it as a “new normal” rather than a high risk
proposition, and the virtuous cycle of trust begetting commitment begetting results
begetting more trust is set in motion. As Isaacs (2010) puts it, once a culture is
established that supports collaborative work, it is as if the group has transcended the
particular individuals involved and created a new identity that pulls additional energy
towards it:
It’s an energetic space, that holds factors of cultural identity in a stable pattern. It
emanates a certain magnetic quality that draws and repels substance. It’s got its
own magnetic center. It’s quite over and above just the relationships themselves.
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We always emphasize that one has to think far beyond relational models.
Relationships are carrier waves for that energy. People of course take these
things quite personally, but it’s not really personal or even about them in
particular. (Isaacs 2010)
E Pluribus Unum Revisited: Social Capital or Social Learning?
This magnetic quality that effective groups have, that draws or “pulls” people in
stands in sharp contrast to the communities we considered at the beginning of this paper.
Indeed, we have come full circle in our exploration of the challenge of e pluribus unum.
Where Putnam observed diverse communities characterized by individuals withdrawing
from the bonds of public life and having lower levels of social capital, here we see
diverse groups of people creating the conditions that actually pull others into them. What
explains this difference? In her analysis of the role of social capital in explaining
individual and group success, fittingly titled Pull, Laird reframes the concept of social
capital in a way that provides some possible solutions (Laird 2006). Her central
argument is that contrary to the myth of the rugged individual pulling himself up by the
bootstraps, our success as individuals is more a function of our connections to others:
In expanding my project to tie the past to the present, I realized that we needed
the words of the social capital lexicon—mentoring, networking, role models,
gatekeeping—to understand how and why some people succeed and others do not.
These words recently came into our everyday language, and they make it possible
to explain how individual merits balance against social assets. (xii)
From this starting point, she then makes three key points: 1) we are parts of social
networks, 2) those networks currently have inequitable distributions of social capital, and
3) that social justice involves finding ways to change the institutions that push some
people out and pull others in to ensure that everyone has a fair shot at success. While I
agree with the larger points, I believe her turn to the conceptual framework of social
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capital is ultimately a decision to be trapped in the lexicon and assumptions of COS 2.0.
The very notion of capital, in all of its forms, trades on industrial metaphors and
smuggles in the fragmentation of humans as isolated, rational entities navigating the
marketplace of society in a quest to maximize individual gain. As I have argued
elsewhere (Fulton and Jordan 2010), I propose that we begin to think less about social
capital found in social networks and more about the social learning that they make
possible in order to truly understand what is happening in situations like those we have
observed above. In these instances, where we see diverse groups thrive in an upward
spiral of trust, commitment, innovation, and progress towards shared goals, we need a
new lexicon to describe the new operating system that appears to be at work here, one
that presumes that society, indeed life in general, is not a struggle between the pluribus
and the unum, but is rather an interconnected, elegant order whose simple patterns yield
surprising, even miraculous, results once we understand them and work with them rather
than against them. The cynic—perhaps the realist—in all of us has been duped so many
times by such propositions that they appear naïve at best and more likely delusional in the
face of the depressing realities of so many of our neighborhoods, cities and even nations
around the world. Still, as I will attempt to argue in what follows, ideas that were taken
as romantic fantasy a mere decade ago are taken as givens in our changing world. The
emerging infrastructures of new systems that presume collaboration, openness, and
shared purpose are the rule, not the exception. These patterns of dialogical, collaborative,
and open systems are creating a new cultural operating system that allows the individual
applications of these principles to connect, combine, and amplify the impact of isolated
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efforts in exciting new ways and are changing how theorists and practitioners alike are
coming to understand the nature of social systems.
Civil Society as a Complex Adaptive System
At first blush, Isaacs’ claim above that a process so connected to personal
relationships is in the end “not really personal” is perplexing to say the least. But this
makes sense if one considers that groups do maintain a certain form or “identity” over
time that transcends the individual people who might come and go as group membership
changes. The paradoxical mix of permanent wholes made from ephemeral parts is of
course familiar in the natural world, and a particular hallmark of our popular
understandings of “quantum reality,” (Herbert 1985), but is less of a given in human
systems. Most people accept the enduring permanence of bureaucracies as impersonal,
and less dependent on the attributes of particular people, but we tend to think of high
functioning organizations and groups as more reliant on the unique qualities of their
leaders, founders, and star players. But this may be changing. The more we learn about
how systems come to “self-organize,” the more intriguing the parallels become between
natural systems and effective human systems. While few people would be flattered in
knowing this, even slime mold, that familiar and furry collection of cells found growing
in damp places, appears to have the ability to self-organize to find not only the shortest
distance through a maze to find food (Johnson 2001), but it won international notoriety
for being able to solve a simulated “shortest distance” challenge of calculating rail line
routes between cities in Japan (BBC, January 22, 2010; Sanders 2010). As Johnson
(2001) puts it,
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While slime mold cells are relatively simple, they have attracted a
disproportionate amount of attention from a number of different disciplines—
embryology, mathematics, computer science—because they display such an
intriguing example of coordinated group behavior. Anyone who has ever
contemplated the great mystery of human physiology—how do all my cells
manage to work so well together?—will find something resonant in the slime
mold’s swarm. If we could only figure out how the Dictyostelium pull it off,
maybe we could gain some insight on our own baffling togetherness. (13)
If we refer back to Koestler’s notion of holons, this “baffling togetherness”
applies to not only our human body, but the body politic as well—the way we organize
ourselves into groups, communities, cities, etc. As important as I believe this community
learning model is to helping communities better address the complex problems they face,
it is unlikely that even the most effective processes run with expert skill and with
sustainable resources would be sufficient to provide the kind of broader change needed to
“reset” our current patterns. Our patterns for addressing the challenges of e pluribus
unum have worn ruts in the public square that keep us retreating into polarized camps,
separated silos, and fragmented institutions. However, if we look to civil society as the
space in which such a transformation were to occur—a space outside the classic
architecture of COS 2.0, the market and the state—then we might begin to imagine how
such new ways of operating could look. In his review of the historical conceptions of
civil society, Michael Edwards (2004) provides a useful framework for understanding
and acting upon civil society. He reviews the different conceptions of civil society that
have evolved over time, and explores the implications of each of them for our approach
to solving the challenges of our age. He lists these three models:
•

Civil Society as Associational Life: in this model, civil society is the space
within which we build free, associational relationships with our fellow
citizens. Also the sector of nonprofits and NGOs.
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•

Civil Society as the Good Society: “civil society represents the
institutionalization of ‘civility’ as a different way of being and living in the
world, or a different kind of society in which all institutions operate in ways
that reinforce these positive social norms—in short, ‘a society that is civil.’”
(39)

•

Civil Society as Public Sphere: “an arena for argument and deliberation as
well as for association and institutional collaboration: a ‘non-legislative, extrajudicial, public space in which societal differences, social problems, public
policy, government action and matters of community and cultural identity are
developed and debated.” (55)

Edwards goes on to argue that there are elements in each of these models that are
applicable and worth preserving, and that their overlap works to produce “an inclusive
associational ecosystem matched by a strong and democratic state, in which a multiplicity
of independent public spheres enable equal participation in setting the rules of the game”
(94). This “associational ecosystem” is in many ways coming to pass all around us, and is
enabling extraordinary acts of collective action for the good. Daniel Pink (2009) opens
his book Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us with an illustrative
example. He asks the reader to imagine having a conversation 15 years ago where
someone asks you to guess which encyclopedia would likely be the world leader in
2010—one that would be created by tens of thousands of volunteers and which is
available for free online, or one created by the top software firm in the world who was
hiring top scholars and top managers to oversee its development. It might have appeared
to be a trick question. Today, thanks to examples like Wikipedia, and the open source
Linux software that runs 60% of the world’s servers, we now take for granted and rely
upon such extraordinary examples of collaboration. When disaster struck in Haiti in
January 2010, tens of millions of dollars were sent by cell phone from millions of
individual donors within a matter of days. All of these are civil society mechanisms, all
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embody a type of self-organizing behavior in which no one person, group, or nation is in
charge, and all of them have self-organized together to build networks of influence and
impact. This is the world of COS 3.0.
Conclusions and Connections
In reviewing the basic elements of the community learning model in greater
detail, I have made the case that not only does it incorporate the lessons learned from a
variety of other models that describe the conditions within which effective groups come
to function, but that it presumes those conditions are accessible to any group that
develops patterns for interacting not just as a set of isolated particles but as a whole
system. That is, as a community focused on learning. We reviewed each of the elements
of the model in terms of the challenge of each stage and the outcomes that describe its
successful resolution. We then reviewed the research that suggests how to best solve
these challenges. We concluded the section with the observation that once a culture of
collaboration is in place, collaborative groups begin to share similar qualities with
complex adaptive systems in nature. In the following section, we will explore this idea in
more detail in order to present the community learning model not so much as a
facilitative method used with “closed systems” and groups in the spirit of COS 2.0, but a
process that catalyzes groups to function as complex adaptive systems connected to a
larger platform of civil society.
Case Studies
The community learning model outlined above provides a way for communities to
enter in to a learning process at any number of places in a continuous cycle. For some,
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that means starting from scratch and deciding on which stakeholders to include in an
intentional process. For others, who already have a history of working together, and who
might have well-developed action plans, the model might apply more as a tool for getting
clearer on their results and gathering data on their progress. In each of the following case
studies, the community learning model plays out slightly differently, but each case
reveals deeper insights into the specific elements of the model as well as overall lessons
on this approach. The first case study plays out at the neighborhood level on the border
between Denver and Aurora, Colorado in an area that participants came to name the
“Yosemite Corridor.” The second case study involves work with rural counties in
Colorado around mental health concerns at a regional level. The third case study
involves a network of people from state agencies, larger nonprofits, and local community
organizations that work across the different domains of early childhood services. I
should note that while I have presented the community learning model in a finalized
state, in truth each of these case studies marks a stage of its evolution. The following
cases are presented in order of their unit of analysis—neighborhood, community, state—
not their chronological evolution. The first was conducted during the years 2005-2007;
the second began in May 2009 and is ongoing; and the third began in August 2009 and is
near completion. I became a part of the first case study wearing the twin hats of both
neighbor and researcher, and that experience helped refine the need for something like
the community learning model. In the second and third case studies, which I took part in
as a contracted facilitator, the model had just been developed and served as a guide for
the design of those projects. Most of the description in these cases comes from personal
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recollection backed up by minutes and other public documents from the meetings, and in
the case of the first case study, from interviews with participants. They are not presented
as in-depth ethnographic studies, but as “thick descriptions” of what transpired in each
situation in the hopes of providing an authentic practical contrast to what I have so far
presented in an idealized manner. In what follows, I will present an overview of the
project in some detail but without commentary, and then review its challenges and
lessons as a way to both bring the community learning model to life as well as to
establish the parameters for what an even broader community learning process would
need to entail. These parameters will set the stage for the design of the process presented
in Chapter Five.
The Neighborhood Level: The Yosemite Corridor
Project Description
Historically, Yosemite Street was seen as the “edge of the map” for Denver and
Aurora, Colorado, and as a result, according to residents in the area, the crime,
prostitution, and drug dealing that animate this economically depressed part of town were
swept back forth between the two cities under the illusion that they would simply fall off
the map. They didn’t, of course, and by 2005, this area appeared as a “hotspot” for police
and other service providers tracking trends of crime, poverty, and migration. Beginning
in 2005, a group of service providers, residents, and city officials gathered to change
these patterns and unite across city boundaries to redefine their community not as simply
the tattered edges of both municipalities, but as a community in its own right, and to
make their neighborhood a safer and a more welcoming place. Over the next 18 months,
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what would become the Yosemite Corridor Coalition formed in an effort to improve the
quality of life in the neighborhoods on both sides of Yosemite Street.
The catalyst for the initial convening of partners was a conference call on
November 15, 2005, from Washington, D. C. as part of the Department of Justice’s
“Outreach to New Americans” program—an attempt, at least in part, to better address the
rising crime rates in areas with high immigrant and refugee populations. The call
succeeded in bringing together 20 people from a range of organizations and agencies
representing housing providers, refugee service organization, community organizing
groups, residents, the local city councilwoman’s office, and business associations.
Though the purpose of the call was ostensibly to help arrange a one day “technical
assistance training workshop” for refugees and for the service providers who work with
them, the group quickly decided that they should continue to meet together apart from
just planning the workshop and by March of 2006, the Yosemite Corridor Safety Action
Committee (YCSAC) had its first purpose statement and first set of tentative goals:
Purpose: To develop and implement both short- and long-term action plans to
increase community safety, inspire economic vitality and improve quality of life
in the Yosemite Corridor neighborhoods.
Possible Goals and Outcomes: With the input from a diverse group of
stakeholders, the development of a long-term, collaborative action plan for the
neighborhood may aim toward the following outcomes:
•

Reduce crime

•

Improve and sustain quality of life

•

Increase coordination of services to residents in the Corridor

•

Increase personal, family and community empowerment
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•

Increase the number and diversity of businesses operating along the Colfax
Corridor

In the early stages of the project, the steering committee for the group consisted of
approximately 10 core members and was led by a facilitator working in the community
through a cross-cultural training program who was known and well respected by a
number of the steering committee members. She helped the group develop a basic
process design of conducting outreach to the broader community to engage partners,
especially residents, in joining a Summit planned for later in the spring. At the Summit,
the community—which at that point had been defined as comprising the residents and
organizations within a 20 x 20 block area extending on both sides of Yosemite Street—
would gather for dinner, develop a joint vision for what they would like their community
to be like, finalize its set of goals, and establish action teams to carry out plans to achieve
it. In preparation for the Summit, each member of the steering committee had defined
roles and action plans related to outreach, logistics, materials, communications, gathering
data, or meeting planning. In addition to the planning of the Summit, the group served as
a way to promote the individual efforts of its members—e.g. promoting community
events, attending each other’s meetings, connecting resources between clients and
providers, etc.
In advance of the Summit, but connected to it, I began facilitating a series of
small dialogues designed as part of my doctoral research. The purpose of the dialogues
was twofold. First, as part of the Yosemite Corridor work, they served as a kind of focus
group in advance of the summit, providing an insight into at least one small group of
people’s views on some of the central questions. Second, as part of my own research,
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they served as a means of exploring some of the central ideas outlined in this project;
namely, to what degree do dialogues convened in an environment like the Yosemite
Corridor display qualities suggested by theorists like Habermas, Bakhtin, and Levinas?
In a description of the dialogue project written at the time, I designed the dialogues as a
way to test the following hypotheses:
•

Divergent truth claims can be reconciled under nearly-ideal speech conditions;

•

Ethical relationships are built through the direct presence of the Other, and are
hindered if we create structures that prevent people from being fully present,
or addressing one another as individuals

•

Conversation exposes the once-occurrentness of life, rather than obscuring it
in theoretical constructs or abstractions.

The format was simple—provide a meal and a space for conversation, inquire into
the issues of concern in the community and the visions participants had for the
community, and to let the conversation evolve where the participants were interested in
taking it. Participants were recruited to attend through fliers and by word of mouth and
offered a meal and a $5 gift card to a local store as an incentive to remain engaged in the
entire sequence of conversations. Approximately 20 different people took in the
dialogues over three different gatherings. After three meetings in the restaurant, the
group wanted to continue to meet and decided to hold the gatherings as pot lucks in each
other’s homes. The dialogues continued on for another nine months in that format and
then blended into the larger Yosemite Corridor process. A second round of dialogues
was launched in March and was held in the community room of one of the affordable
housing units in the area. This round was jointly convened with a partner agency
interested in better understanding the service needs of the community and was willing to
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cover the costs of food and outreach as their contribution to the dialogues. The second
round was intended to last for 4-6 sessions but ended after three.
The Summit, although initially conceived as an all-day Saturday event, ended up
being held as series of four, 2-hour forums held monthly beginning in May and extended
through August. Twenty nine people attended the May forum, where the facilitator led
the group through small group discussions culminated in a large-group brainstorm in
response to the question “What would you like to see in your community in the next 10
years?” The answers were clustered and categorized into the following themes:
recreational facilities and events that bring people together; a clean, safe and secure
community; a unified, stable, welcoming, integrated community; a proud, thriving,
beautiful community; strong commerce for local prosperity; “It takes a corridor” (strong
networks of caretakers and families supporting children); community supported life-long
learning; and a healthy community. At the June and July forums, the group mapped the
various assets in the community that related to each of these themes within the vision
statements, and then began to meet in action teams around each theme to take on projects
related to that theme. The August forum was attended by 37 people, including one Aurora
City Councilwoman, a Denver Councilwoman, a Police Commander and four officers
from Aurora, a Police Commander and five Denver officers, and a wide range of service
providers in the area. The agenda focused on discussions of police collaboration between
Denver and Aurora, and presentations from nonprofit groups serving the community in
ways that related to the vision themes.
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Based on the energy and interest level, the group decided to continue on with the
monthly forum format past the original four meeting format. The original facilitator, who
had provided leadership in the early stages of the project, was unable to continue due to a
change in job status, which caused uncertainty and even tension around how to fill that
role. I ended up stepping in to help, as well as several other steering committee
members. By November, the attendance at monthly forums had waned and the steering
committee agreed to hold fewer forums and work in small committees through the winter,
and then regroup in the spring with a “Walk the Block” project suggested by a local
neighborhood leader based on a similar project she had organized in the years before.
Attendance at meetings remained low through the winter, with a slight increase in
attendance and engagement as preparations were made for the Yosemite Corridor Walk
the Block Day, which was held on April 21, 2007. Approximately 15 people attended and
walked through the neighborhood door-to-door in teams of two, asking residents about
issues of concern, whether they would be willing to be a block captain for the
Neighborhood Watch program, and if they had ideas for how to improve the
neighborhood. Response to the effort was largely positive, although because of turnover
in the leadership of the steering committee, the event essentially marked the last
significant effort of the Yosemite Corridor Coalition. There were a few more meetings
over the summer, and an attempt to revive it in the fall of 2007, but by November, the
meetings had ended.
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Participant Reflections on the Process
I conducted six interviews with participants afterwards to assess their view of the
dialogues as well as the larger summits and action plans. Five of the six interviewees had
taken part in both, and one took part only in the larger forums and steering committee
meetings. From the dialogues, a number of common themes emerged:
•

People appreciated the tone and informal nature of the dialogues, and how the
group developed strong relationships and genuinely liked being together. As
one person said, “The energy in the room was so much more captive, so much
more engaged when we were here in the dialogues compared to the bigger
meetings.”

•

They particularly liked the stage of the dialogues that were potlucks, since it
involved both the chance to socialize in other people’s homes and the chance
to “do something” together by making a meal.

•

Three of the participants commented that they liked the feeling that it was
“community,” rather than “resource”—meaning that the dialogues were
attended by actual residents of the community who wanted to stay and get to
know each other, rather than “resource providers” who attend to share
information.

The reflections on the forums and ongoing Yosemite Corridor meetings revealed
far more divergent experiences. Although almost all of the interviewees noted the same
pivotal stages in the process, they all had different experiences of each event, and reached
different conclusions about the meaning and significance of each. The pivotal stages and
a sample of responses include the following:
•

The manner in which the forums were facilitated
o Two participants noted this as a highpoint of the process, four felt they
were too much process and could tell that people were losing interest
throughout

•

The transition of leadership in the fall when the initial facilitator was unable to
continue on due to a change in job status and the conflicts that surrounded it
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o For one of the participants, the facilitator was perceived to have been
“shown the door” in the process; for the facilitator, she was both relieved
that I was willing to help step in as she was unable to continue and at the
same time felt that there was tension over the leadership transition; one
interviewee didn’t understand what transpired during that section of the
process, but sensed conflicts; and three of the interviewees felt it was a
necessary change that improved the process.
•

Internal conflicts among steering committee members that stalled the process.
o Five of the six interviewees noted that the planning process over the
winter was marked by tensions and conflicts, sometimes overt and
sometimes subtle, amongst members. Each seemed to have a different
idea for how to manage the different committees, the true focus of the
effort in general, and how to share leadership of the process.
o As one interviewee said about this stage, “We focused too much on
growing the group, and not enough on the relationships in the group that
came.”

•

A second transition of leadership with my departure in June 2007 and my
successor’s departure two months after that.
o One participant felt “betrayed and hurt” by my departure, feeling that my
motivation was just related to my research not the community. The other
five participants commented on this transition as a function of not having
enough resident leadership in the first place to sustain the project, and that
when outside leaders came and went there was nothing to sustain it.
Findings and Lessons Learned

In terms of my inquiry into the nature of dialogue through this project, a number
of findings stand out. First, while it is difficult to cite specific examples of moments that
spoke to “Habermas in action” as I might have naively imagined at the outset, there was
clear evidence from the interviews, and my own experience of the project, that there was
indeed a qualitative difference in the group that took part in the dialogues and the group
that met in the larger forums. And given the fact that five of the six people were in both,
it is clear to me that the depiction of dialogue as a relational space, and a place where
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people care for the Other, and where people learn to think together is borne out here.
Even more, not a single person commented on the actual content of the dialogues—the
ideas that emerged, the insights they gained—but all commented on the tone and the feel
of being in the conversations. While not the full meaning of Levinas’ distinction between
the saying and the said, these reflections confirm that distinction in the actual experience
of dialogue in community. Their comments also attest to the “once-occurrent act of
Being,” in contrast to the tendency to hide behind abstractions in meetings. The other
people—the Other—is there, immediate, and demanding a direct response. There is no
generic audience in dialogue, just the fellow members in the circle. The interviewees did
not make any comments on, nor did I observe, any examples where the group had to
work through conflicting views to reach consensus or make a decision, so it was more
difficult to observe the notion of “the unforced force of the better argument,” or how
people made and responded to validity claims in more than a passing manner. However,
when considering the high degree of frustration and conflict experienced by the
interviewees in other aspects of the project, the quality of their experience and sense of
solidarity with each other and the project was demonstrably higher in the dialogues when
compared to the more formal structures. Even more, considering the example of the
potluck gatherings in comparison the general challenge of promoting resident leadership,
dialogue appears to have aided in the deepening of both process commitment and
leadership for participants. In summary, the following lessons from the dialogues stand
out:
•

The space of dialogue is experienced as categorically different from what
most community members experience in “community meetings,” and
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embodies to a high degree the principles laid out by Bohm, Bakhtin and
Levinas.
•

In comparison to more formal meeting structures and communication patterns,
dialogue proved to be much more effective at building relationships, trust,
commitment, and understanding amongst group members.

•

While there were fewer tangible work products generated during the dialogues
that aided the overall project, it is possible, although untested here, that once
the relationships and commitment were established, the participants could
have focused their energies on other specific aspects of the project as long as
it did not jeopardize the overall tone of the dialogue.

In terms of the broader overall Yosemite Corridor project, this case study raised a
number of important and admittedly difficult issues for me as my role involved being a
participant, facilitator, and researcher. First, the lack of clarity around my own status—
neighbor, researcher, facilitator, outsider—seemed to mirror the general lack of clarity of
roles and leadership in the project and contributed to the overall instability of the project.
This point underscores the need to establish strong facilitative leadership roles in advance
of the process (Ansell and Gash 2008; Chrislip and Larson 1994). Second, in light of the
persistent emotional turmoil experienced by the group, we never established a container
strong enough to hold the process and allow for the honest and open communication
needed to resolve tensions (Isaacs 1999). Third, when those forums are specifically
aimed at defining a set of goals for the group to work toward they give the individual
members a much more powerful and legitimated road map to work from and mandate.
Fourth, the group definitely was at its best with tangible products to engage in that set an
“action orientation” and generated what participants described as engagement, buzz and
energy in the group (LaFasto and Larson 2001). Fifth, resources must be in place to
maintain the ongoing communication and follow up to the work. Several interviewees
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noted the critical importance of follow through on the basic tasks of the project. With
such shifting and distributed leadership, it was difficult to maintain accountability. Lastly,
and perhaps most unfortunately, the clear and negative impact of my own departure from
the project, and the short tenure of the woman who stepped in to help take over in a
facilitative role, was of pivotal importance in the final analysis. Five of the participants
regarded my departure as unfortunate, although they seemed to understand the financial
challenges of my spending 18 months as a volunteer. Three noted that they ultimately
considered the connection between my departure and the ensuing end of the project
related larger issue of needing to more intentionally foster leadership amongst residents.
Still, the fact that one of the participants perceived it as a betrayal was sobering to say the
least. How much of that was due to my dual role as researcher and participant is unclear,
but at the very least, it reveals the importance of both role clarity and leadership
succession planning. As one interviewee noted, “this was never really owned by the
community.”
Community Level: Mental Health Project in Rural Colorado
Project Description
In the fall of 2009, a community in rural Colorado began the implementation of a
pilot program to bring community members together to better support the mental health
needs of the community. While the pilot project was not able to provide new funding to
communities, technical assistance in the form of facilitation and project design was
provided to the community. The presenting issue for this group was the challenge of
providing acute crisis care in such a remote region. Participants spoke of both the human
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cost and the financial cost of having to transport people experiencing mental health crises
in the back of a police car, in handcuffs, for the 2-3 hour ride to the nearest crisis facility.
In their application to take part in the project, the group suggested that the need to build a
new crisis center was high on the list of intended outcomes from the project.
We engaged them in a four step process, covering the elements of the community
learning model. The outreach was intentionally inclusive, beyond just mental health
workers. Participants included staff from the local mental health center, the local sheriff,
representatives from local nonprofits, county commissioners, community college
professors, and others. In the first meeting, the group identified common outcomes and
potential indicators to assess progress. In the next meeting, they assessed the available
assets and other partners in the community who might be willing to assist with the effort,
and then invited them to the next meeting. In the third meeting, they experienced a
breakthrough when crafting action plans to better address their most central acute care
needs. Though they originally considered their challenge to be the lack of an acute crisis
care center, when they looked more deeply into the nature of the challenge, it revealed
itself to be the inability to match available resources in real-time with the specific needs
of a client. They estimated that 80% of the people who experience acute crisis really
don’t need to be taken into police care or driven to a crisis center; they simply need
someone who can accurately assess their situation, provide a safe bed, and someone to sit
with them until the crisis passes. Once the crisis is passed, other community partners
could then be tapped to provide the additional care and support often associated with the
times of crisis, such as food, shelter, clothing, and counseling.
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What became clear was the fact that although there was no centralized source of
those resources, they were in fact distributed within the network of partners. The assisted
living center had beds, as did the hospital. The local community college had psychology
students who would be good candidates to be trained as “sitters” while the crisis passed.
The mental health center already had a triage unit on-call full time, so they simply needed
to become a hub and connecter of resources to help match the person to the appropriate
level of care. In some instances, that would continue to be police escort and major
intervention. But in the vast majority of cases, it would mean providing linkages to the
right combination of services. In the final meeting, we stepped out of the facilitation role
and helped the chairs of the subcommittees run the meeting and lead the group forward
into its next steps.
Findings and Lessons Learned
While no interviews were conducted with participants after the series of meeting
to gather data on their experience, the informal feedback on end-of-meeting comment
cards was consistently high. In contrast to the Yosemite Corridor case study, the mental
health project was explicitly guided by the community learning model. The intention
behind each stage yielded, for the most part, the key intended outcomes. We entered with
a clear collaborative process that established facilitative leadership and a strong local
partner to ensure follow up and local ownership. We included anyone interested in
taking part, but kept the group size manageable and ensured each meeting had a tangible
outcome to keep interest and the “action orientation” high. While there was no use of
informal settings to foster dialogue, the general tone of the discussion was dialogical in
104

quality, with an emphasis on listening, responding, and people thinking together about
the nature of the problems they face. This helped them explore the underlying nature of
the challenges and yielded new insights and a sense of openness that no doubt contributed
to the eventual breakthrough. These conversations also produced a short list of outcomes
that were validated by the participants, real-time, through remote “clickers,” which
yielded demonstrably high levels of consensus. The asset mapping conversation helped
to identify available resources in the community, which proved pivotal in creating the
breakthrough at the next meeting.
A second lesson was how important it was to foster a shared, and concrete,
understanding of both the problem, and need to find a solution. When someone
mentioned the example of the client who had cost the system at least $300,000 that year,
but who was still essentially homeless and unstable, it was clear that there were real
benefits to moving toward a more coordinated effort, and potentially direct cost savings.
It was easy to see inefficiencies and costs of not coordinating their efforts around real
results. The fact that this person was known to most people in the room immediately
humanized the issue in a palpable way. For the sheriff, who originally referenced the
clients as essentially not his problem, and a burden on the system, the care and concern
for them changed throughout the process as well. Also, there were efficiencies discovered
by confronting the assumptions around liability insurance and cost of care that are likely
to provide future benefits in terms of better trust and coordination of efforts between the
hospital and the mental health center. The power of results-based thinking also proved
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useful, as it took everyone outside of their usual sphere of influence and activity into a
more purposeful focus on the real underlying issues.
Systems Level: Early Childhood “Framework in Action” Project
Project Description
In May 2009, I began working with a state-level team to develop an
implementation plan for the Early Childhood Colorado Framework—a one page
summary that literally brought the disparate network of organizations and systems
serving children between birth and age eight “onto the same page.” The Framework
contains goals, outcomes, strategies, and principles for serving children and families in
Colorado, toward the goal of ensuring that “all children are valued, healthy, and
thriving.” Though the Framework was completed in 2008, previous attempts to develop
an action plan around it had proven elusive. The Implementation Plan was a necessary
part of complying with a federal grant that funded the state systems building work in
Colorado, with a report due by the end of the year.
A small leadership team was formed to develop the basic outline of an approach
to the planning process. Deciding what it meant to “implement” a framework that covers
the entire spectrum of early childhood outcomes and service delivery posed some
immediate challenges. First, because the outcomes and strategies cut across the four
domains of early learning, family support and parent education, social emotional and
mental health, and health, they are monitored by a number of departments within state
government and state-level nonprofit organizations with different funding and
accountability requirements. In addition, much of the coordinating work of early
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childhood service delivery happens through the 31 county-level Early Childhood
Councils across the state. These Councils coordinate services and technical assistance
amongst providers, agencies and other institutions at the local level. As a result, unlike
most strategic plans that can be implemented within a common administrative
framework, implementing the Framework would require a more collaborative approach—
not just between government agencies at the state level, but between local providers and
state level actors. This had proven difficult at times in the past because of overlapping
lines of authority and accountability, leading to understandable tensions and even
confusion over who had the legitimate “credibility to convene” any given initiative
(Chrislip 2002). Mindful of these dynamics, and the need to establish legitimacy and buy
in from stakeholders through a general commitment to common outcomes rather than
through administrative authority, the planning team opted to use the general framework
of the community learning model as an approach for the implementation plan. A similar
approach had been used with success in Connecticut (Connecticut Early Childhood
Education Cabinet 2006) and was consistent with established results-based frameworks
(Friedman 2000).
The planning team—a group of six early childhood experts with expertise
spanning across state departments and nonprofits and at both local and state levels—met
in June and July to develop the plan for walking through the basic steps of the learning
model: include a diverse group of participants from across the different domains,
departments, and state/local contexts; engage in dialogue around which of the outcomes
were most important in terms of being signs of progress at the systems level across all
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four domains (outcomes we labeled metaphorically as the “vital signs” of the system),
reach consensus on those high level outcomes and a handful of measurable indicators for
each one to track progress; scan the existing efforts that were already making progress
toward these outcomes and tap into local leadership to help coordinate efforts; convene
partners regularly to promote network-wide communication and to learn from each
other’s efforts; gather data on the current status of the outcomes and indicators and then
reassess progress on a regular basis; and continue the cycle of learning to build a culture
of collaboration across the state and local systems and networks. The planning team felt
this was a prudent model, but wanted to be sure to balance the need for buy in from all
stakeholders—legitimacy was paramount in their minds—but also to recognize that many
had developed “process fatigue” after so many years of “systems building.” This overall
plan was to be initiated in August and would need to be concluded by the end of the year,
so the process would need to be quick but not come across as rushed, lest it set off alarm
bells of resistance and suspicion that this input process was not in fact authentic. We
agreed on a strategy of having the planning team take each of the steps in the planning
process in advance of a larger network-wide meeting to develop a rough draft or “starter
dough” of each particular deliverable along the way, to present that draft for feedback at
the network meeting, and to finalize that feedback in an iterative process. They argued
that this would help strike the right balance between being inclusive and open to input
while still getting to action fast enough so people could see progress between meetings.
The first meeting of network partners on August 17 was designed to explain the
overall approach and to seek feedback and agreement on the first set of high level
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outcomes for the implementation plan. The group of approximately 40 partners offered
mostly minor suggestions on the proposed outcomes and general endorsement, but
suggested adding an additional outcome on family engagement to the four that were
presented. The planning team then took the group’s feedback and used these outcomes to
form small working groups assigned to identify the best set of measurable indicators to
track them, and to bring them back to the full network in October for review and
approval. The process of defining the key outcomes and indicators raised some of the
predictable challenges. Since the field is divided into four distinct domains—early
learning, health, social emotional health, and family engagement and parent education—
and the possible set of indicators were identified with only one of these domains in the
actual Framework, there was tremendous unspoken pressure early on to make sure each
domain was equally represented. However, relying on the explicit interest in the group—
and in most fields—to avoid “silos” and “turf issues,” the planning team agreed upon
criteria in advance of the selection: the indicators needed to be population-based, shared,
simple, solution-building, silo-busting, and based on data that was cross-domain and
readily available. Based on those criteria, they reviewed the extensive list of potential
indicators that had been developed over the years through various commissions and
reports, and selected another “starter dough” set of indicators to bring to the small groups
working on each outcome. In the end, the outcomes selected and indicators associated
with them were presented with the rationale of how they cut across all domains, even if
they resided in just one on the Framework. When the small groups presented their work
in October, it was generally well received, with minor changes made and presented at a
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network meeting on December 1, where the full set were finalized as “wet cement”—that
is, there was still time for small tweaks before the implementation plan, or “Framework
in Action,” was finalized, but it was assumed that they were pretty well set. At that
meeting, 81% of the 36 attendees either strongly agreed (39%) or agreed (42%) that the
outcomes and indicators selected provided a solid foundation for working together to
implement the Framework in Action.
The next steps were to capture the stories behind each of the outcome areas to add
context to the work—what does that outcome look like at the community level, what are
the challenges, how are people approaching it—as well as to capture the wide array of
efforts already underway to achieve that outcome. At the January meeting of the
network, different network partners, most of whom were not on the core planning team,
began to play a leadership role in explaining the Framework in Action plan, presenting
the work they were doing to achieve results, and to help convene conversations with
other partners around the different outcome areas. The results of these conversations
were included into the updated draft of the Framework in Action document, which was
then finalized and shared at the April meeting of partners. The April meeting thus
marked an important turning point in the process, since it shifted from a network
convened by a planning team to complete a particular task with an external locus of
accountability (the federal grant report) to a network of partners meeting to communicate,
learn, and make progress towards the goals they had selected. Accordingly, the agenda
transitioned from being planned in advance by the core planning team to a more open
model to be filled in by the needs of the network. To mark that transition, the first half of
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the meeting would be planned in advance to give people a chance to work in outcome
areas again and review their progress from the January meeting, and the second half of
the agenda would be dedicated to the needs of the network using a facilitation technique
called “open space technology”—a technique developed by Harrison Owen (Owen 1997)
he developed upon realizing that the best conversations at conferences actually happened
amidst the buzz of the “open spaces” in between the sessions, like coffee breaks and
lunch, rather than in the sessions themselves. The feedback on this approach was
positive, and it was therefore used as the foundation for subsequent network meetings.
Participants noted that they wanted to continue to meet by result areas as well to connect
and learn from each other, so beginning at the June meeting, these conversations were
structured using a “consultancy protocol,” adapted from the work of Steve Seidel at
Harvard’s Project ZERO (Hatch and Seidel 1997), that helps groups discuss their practice
in non-defensive ways that contribute to the development of learning communities. The
results of this approach were also favorably received and the two part agenda of open
space and consultancy protocol were again used at the August meeting of partners, and
now form the basic pattern for the continual cycle of quarterly network meetings.
Findings and Lessons Learned
This planning process proved to be very successful at not only producing a
specific work product—the grant report—but also in building a collaborative network of
partners that is now, to a large degree, “self-organizing” and functioning as a learning
community. Again, the basic strengths of the community learning model were validated
in this approach, although a few friction points emerged that are noted below. But while
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the community learning model approach explains to some degree the successful
outcomes, equally salient were the particular skills, decisions, and credibility of the core
planning team themselves. Some of these are unique to the individuals involved, and
therefore not able to be generalized across contexts, but some of their approaches help
identify more general techniques that can be incorporated into the overall model to
resolve some of the tensions identified previously and discussed in prior sections (Ansell
and Gash 2008; Johnston et al. 2010). In terms of the model itself, the focus on results
proved critical as a way to not only provide a general goal orientation but as means of
coordinating otherwise fragmented efforts. This illustrated Bohman’s (2000) point that
deliberation is dialogical to the extent that even though there was a de facto presumption
that the group held the same goals because they were all united under the broad banner of
the Framework, the actual reasons that proved compelling for their shared support of the
Framework in Action could not be specified in advance and emerged in the dialogical
give and take in the moment. That is, consensus was achieved only in response to the
particular concerns raised by particular participants, not just based on generalized
arguments about notions of “shared accountability” or other abstract agreements.
Because of that, the group was expanding the lifeworld of its shared meaning (Habermas
1987) and was then better able to be persuaded by the unforced force of the better
argument. One could not simply be opposed, and claim a different set of principles as the
justification; they were all circulating a common currency of meaning. This did not
means conflicts and tensions did not arise—they did—and likely still linger, but as
Bohman (2000) argues, the goal of deliberating over joint action is not necessarily
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uniform consensus but an agreement to keep working together in good faith in
constructive ways, which appears to be the case. Second, the presumption within the
model that “taking action” is often more a matter of incorporating existing efforts than
needing to take on new projects proved helpful in both conveying an action orientation—
e.g. “look at all that is already happening to achieve these goals”—but also in spreading
the commitment to the process by honoring the leadership of a broader range of partners
than just those on the official leadership team. This is a novel application of the concept
of transfer of commitment, because the process traded on the commitment that these
partners already had to their own work, and transferred that to the broader, collective
process. This does not remove the challenge of actually ensuring that complex, dispersed
activities do in fact follow through and make a difference, but it at least increases the
odds that such will be the case. Finally, the identification of results within an iterative
learning process potentially helps resolve a challenge identified early on in the planning
process. When I had asked early on how data was used within the network, most agreed
that the typical process is for a report to be released, a press conference is called,
concerns are expressed and captured in headlines, and then everyone goes back to their
already overwhelming responsibilities until the next report comes out citing a new set of
troubling data and the cycle continues. The hope in the case of the Framework-in-Action
is that since the network helped adopt these measures of progress as meaningful to them,
and since they are the primary actors in ensuring progress, that the yearly review of
progress—based on the routine habits of non-defensive inquiry into improving their
practice—will help change the culture of using and learning from data as a network, and
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that over time, meaningful progress will be in fact demonstrated. Finally, a key
validation of the model is the degree to which it has moved from a facilitative technique
and process design through an upward spiral of increased trust and ownership to become
the basis of complex, adaptive learning network of partners. It is still too early in its
history to consider it a full success, but the early signs are encouraging.
As for the specific skills and decisions of the planning team that were fortuitous to
this case but not generalizable across all process, I will name two. Much of their success
can be attributed to the lead staff member who was exceptional in her ability to plan
backwards from the due date, synthesize feedback into new drafts, and to ensure nothing
was lost in the follow up and execution of the process. In addition, her technical process
skills were matched with a broad base of trust and credibility amongst partners that
helped ensure buy in. While such a combination of skills is hard to count on in all
processes, this case points out the benefits of skill process management and execution.
Similarly, members of the planning team possessed a broad base of expertise and a
genuine dedication to the common effort and not only to their particular institution. Their
internal commitment to each other and to the process undoubtedly carried forward in the
network meetings, and served as key form of facilitative, distributed leadership
throughout the process.
Fortunately, much of their skill translated into specific moves that are more
generalizable. The technique of balancing momentum and inclusion through the
metaphors of “starter dough” and “wet cement” made the approach transparent and well
received by the group, who felt both their time and their input was being respected. The
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fact that initial drafts were substantively changed—and I would argue improved—by the
broader group reinforced this belief. Additionally, the notion of a Framework in Action
accomplished two important objectives that have broader application. It built on the
existing commitment to the Early Childhood Colorado Framework rather than
introducing the effort as a new entity such as strategic plan or state plan, which can easily
be dismissed as something no one in particular has responsibility for. Second, the notion
of a Framework in Action conveys an approach that is ongoing and immediate, rather
than a plan with a particular shelf life that expires and grows stale. This framing is more
consistent with the themes of being attentive to energy states of actors, onceoccurrentness of communication, and the organic and adaptive nature of process.
Conclusions and Connections
From the review of the community learning model set within the context of these
concrete case studies, we see a number of challenges that the model faces as well as a
number of assets it brings to communities. As we turn now to the question of how we
might apply the lessons gleaned so far to a more robust attempt to install a new COS 3.0
operating system within a broader community context, let us review the parameters and
challenges that such an effort must adequately address.
•

Set a dialogical tone—informal, welcoming, listening, respecting

•

Give people the chance to build relationships of trust, especially early on with
a core group

•

Balance a dialogical tone with the need to take action and get “quick wins”
early in the process

•

Ensure that the community, especially local residents, take leadership and
ownership
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•

Ensure mutual understand as a hallmark of process throughout

•

Focus early on setting clear, elevating goals with ways to measure progress

•

Ensure adequate resources from the start—dollars and human capacity—so
the process is not overly burdened by questions of sustainability

•

Ensure shared leadership structures that can overcome turnover of participants
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CHAPTER FIVE: RAISING THE CIVIC CANOPY
Creating the Canopy: From Theory to Practice
In this final chapter, I will combine the building blocks from the previous chapters
into a more coherent whole and attempt to create a blue print for creating a new
community “platform” based on the principles of COS 3.0 in an area of Denver and
Aurora known as the “Children’s Corridor” (Piton Foundation 2010). Since this is a
concept in formation that draws from similar theory and has an overlapping base of
practice with the examples reviewed here, the Children’s Corridor provides an ideal
context for helping raise the civic canopy brought about by COS 3.0. I will begin with a
description of the context of the communities that are incorporated within the larger
Corridor, including demographic descriptions and a broad scan of historical and
contemporary efforts to improve the quality of community life in the Corridor. In many
ways, this description highlights the challenges of a COS 2.0 approach to community
development and is characterized by patterns and systems that reinforce fragmentation,
duplication, and disengagement despite the best attempts of partners working to improve
the life of residents in the area. I will then walk through the stages of the community
learning model as it might be introduced into the Corridor, paying specific attention to
the parameters and “design specifications” gleaned from the case studies in the last
chapter. Finally, I will offer final reflections on the nature of this project and potential
implications for future research and for future community engagement activities.
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Context of the Children’s Corridor
Demographic Profile
The Children’s Corridor is a concept being developed by the Piton Foundation, a
private, Denver-based operating foundation that has a long history of local funding in the
areas of education, health, and community development (Piton Foundation 2010). As
currently conceived, the Children’s Corridor comprises a 14 mile-long corridor extending
from downtown Denver along the I-70 corridor to the areas of Montbello and Green
Valley Ranch, the eastern-most neighborhoods in Denver located near the Denver
International Airport. The area is home to over 48,000 children, two thirds of whom live
in poverty, and who live in neighborhoods with some of the highest rates of foreclosure,
vulnerable births, and dropout rates in the city (5). The proximity to the I-70 corridor,
and a history of segregation in the neighborhoods, has made the gang problem a general
concern with periods of acute crisis. However, the Corridor does have a number of
important assets, including strong, diverse neighbors that provide a number of distinct
and unique “nodes” across the Corridor. These include: the Far Northeast (Montbello
and Green Valley Ranch); Stapleton; Original Aurora; Northeast Park Hill; Northeast
Denver (Clayton, Cole, Whittier, Skyland); and Five Points.
Past Efforts and Current Opportunity
The corridor is rich in social resources as well, including hundreds of nonprofits,
dozens of churches and faith-based organizations, schools, libraries, community centers,
and well-established neighborhood organizations that dot the landscape and are active in
the area. The development of the Stapleton neighborhood from the former airport has
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brought an influx of shops, restaurants, and businesses, and with them new jobs, new
schools, and new services. In addition, there are a variety of community-building
initiatives that have invested for years in the civic infrastructure of the area, including the
Strengthening Neighborhoods program from the Denver Foundation which fosters
resident-driven change; the Stapleton Foundation’s “be well” zone that promotes active
and healthy living; Oakwood Homes’ Foundation for Educational Excellence and a
newly opened Dr. Evie Dennis Campus of schools; Park Hill Thriving Communities
grant-funded community organizing effort; and dozens of local community and school
organizing projects. While these are important resources for the community, part of the
motivation for the Children’s Corridor initiative is the belief that these assets are
somehow less than the sum of their parts. Isolated efforts come and go, new projects
arrive without knowledge of past work, and the residents of the area often experience
these services not as a supportive web but as a fragmented field of disconnected
programs. As a reflection of the crisis of COS 2.0, organizations tend to perceive
themselves as under-resourced and constrained by the bureaucracies of school systems
and city agencies, and residents see themselves as clients and customers of these systems
rather than agents of change. According to staff members who have spent decades
working in these communities, after years of meetings and change efforts that promised
much but delivered little, many residents have grown skeptical that the situation in these
neighborhoods is likely to change for the better anytime soon.
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A New Vision
To counteract these trends, and “consolidate its investments in a single geographic
area,” the Piton Foundation aims to “elevate the success of all children and families to
promote integrated and connected high quality systems of health, wellness, and education
that produce lifelong results.” They envision the Children’s Corridor not as a separate
new initiative, but as a “platform for collaboration and innovation” needed to truly
support all children (Piton 2010, 3). Using the successful Harlem Children’s Zone
created by Geoffrey Canada as an example, the Piton Foundation envisions a pipeline of
high-quality health educational services readily available to each family that ensures a
continuous source of support for children as they transition the critical stages of their
development. Rather than simply funding more services or introducing specific
programs, Piton explains its role as catalyst for change, using a number of key tools and
strategies, including:
•

Visibility—making the problem and the solutions visible

•

Connectivity—linking and integrating elements of the solution in space and
time

•

Leverage—bringing multiple forces to bear

•

Innovation—tapping and nurturing the best new ideas

•

Amplification—taking success to scale

Constructing the Platform through the Community Learning Process
Overview
Based on the theory and the research base we have reviewed thus far, it is my
contention that the success of the Children’s Corridor vision is dependent on its ability to
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invent a new way of engaging community in the process of growth and development.
The assumptions of COS 2.0—of client/provider relationships, competition amongst
providers, of isolated initiatives, and of town-down funding mandates and accountability
mechanisms—cannot produce an integrated, seamless pipeline of services, nor can it
inspire the kind of engagement from residents themselves that will lead them to do so
either. As we have seen, the secret of collaborative success lies in generating the
conditions for the community to function as an “inclusive associational ecosystem” with
a common focus on the most important outcomes, webs of reciprocal relationships
amongst all partners, and networks of collaborative actors working with each other rather
than against each other. To truly bring the vision of the Children’s Corridor to life, and
to provide a new “platform for collaboration and innovation,” will take a three stage
process of 1) using the community learning model with a diverse group of core leaders in
the community to 2) help the neighborhoods function as a complex adaptive learning
system to 3) build on the in-person and on-line “civic network” platform.
Establishing a Collaborative Process
A critical first step in establishing the community learning process will be to
establish the core leadership team (Chrislip 2002) and the facilitative leadership (Ansell
and Gash 2008) needed to both establish the credibility to convene as well as to
accurately assess the context within the Corridor as it applies to this efforts. Because of
the history of large scale initiatives in the area that have seldom produced lasting impact,
it is imperative that a core group of leaders with demonstrated commitment to the quality
of life in the corridor have a chance to sift through the concepts underlying the Children’s
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Corridor approach in a dialogical, informal way to begin with, both as a way to disrupt
the patterns of foundation-initiated efforts and to develop the kinds of trusting and
committed relationships noted in the successful collaborative examples. Given Piton’s
commitment to building a lasting foundation for collaboration, it makes sense to use the
deliberative planning with the core leadership team and to get their help with their
guidance in developing a thoughtful inclusion approach to involve others in the
subsequent stages of the community learning model (Johnston et al. 2008). However,
given the scope and scale of the Corridor concept, it is likely that the process will also
need to establish in the very early stages a way for anyone who is interested in the idea to
have a place at the table and have meaningful ways to share their input throughout the
process. Here we face a dilemma. Involve too many too soon and the process of
building and transferring commitment is jeopardized; remain insular too long and people
feel mistrustful and suspicious. As word spreads about the effort, it is essential to
provide people with an immediate way to plug into the effort—via a website I will
describe in detail below—that does not risk losing or diluting the initial stores of trust and
commitment that the planning group will be developing. Surveys, interviews, and
environmental scans can also serve this purpose. Given the percentage of Spanish
speaking families in the Corridor, this will of course need to be done in both Spanish and
English. As that group understands, adapts, and grows more comfortable with the
approach of the Children’s Corridor, they will be ready to move from constructing the
collaborative process design to beginning to implement it, beginning with thoughtful
community dialogue.
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Inclusion and Dialogue
As a result of both the environmental scans of the existing efforts in the area, as
well as through the recommendations of the core leadership team, a growing network of
people who will likely be interested in the Children’s Corridor concept will be developed.
Because there is no specific initiative to “launch” or “kick off,” there is no need for a
series of high profile meetings or gatherings that can, as was the case of the Yosemite
Corridor Summits, become breeding grounds for heightened expectations of what the
project will do for the community, followed by disappointment at what was not
accomplished. This model presumes the need to create spaces for people to be welcomed
into an expanding network of members of a shared community involved in a shared
enterprise—as opposed to the relationship of clients and customers that COS 2.0
institutions typically develop with people. This is not an initiative with a solution in
search of a problem, nor does it presume the community’s challenges define its identity.
Rather, as Peter Block (2008) notes,
The essential challenge is to transform the isolation and self-interest within our
communities into connectedness and caring for the whole. The key is to identify
how this transformation occurs. We begin by shifting our attention from the
problems of community to the possibility of community. (1)
For Block, as for the community learning model, community is ultimately the
“structure of belonging,” the way people come to include others in and feel included by
the broader whole. For that reason, the inclusion stage of the process is essentially
blended with the dialogue stage, where individual conversations and small, informal
groups will gather, hosted by members of the core leadership team and supported by staff
as needed, and reach out to include the broader networks of participants in the overall
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process. As was the case in the Yosemite Corridor dialogues, there is less an “agenda” in
the early stages than an opportunity for people to share stories, raise questions, and
imagine together the kind of community they hope to see. In these early stages, a key
objective is establish the norms and values of this new operating system as being
inclusive of different “comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls 1996) and plural notions of what
is best for the community. When handled in the safe setting of a dialogue, these norms
are easier to impart and reinforce, than they are in the contested ground of large,
impersonal public meetings. The content or the “said” of these conversations will be
worth tracking and noting but is ultimately less critical early on than the “saying.” While
some information will need to be shared about the Children’s Corridor concept and
approach, people in general will learn more about what it means from the way they are
welcomed into conversation, the way their questions and stories are responded to and
honored, and the way they see others demonstrate their commitment to the effort than
they will from a brochure or program description.
Having touted the virtues of dialogue as a means of inclusion in this process, it
should be noted that is not always effective, and nor is it the only way. Dialogue is no
cure-all for the need some people have to vent a grievance in any form possible, or to coopt a well intentioned forum in service of a cause with decidedly different underlying
values. This effort will be particularly prone to this in the early stages, when the shared
values are less established, and the early gatherings will likely need the sure hands of
skilled facilitative leaders from the community whose conversational skills and general
credibility will act as a deterrent to such dynamics. In addition, it is important to expand
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the inclusion efforts beyond just dialogues, and to engage people through celebrations
and communal activities that enable informal interaction as well as dancing, music, food,
pictures, and recognition of things people love. Similarly, honoring of history and of
people’s efforts that have come before is critical to the building of community of
establishing a new way of operating in the Corridor.
Results
As the outreach continues, and the container for dialogue is increasingly stabile
and ready to shift to the next stage, it will be important to test out the community’s level
of support for common goals and measurable objectives. Keeping in mind the lessons
from the Early Childhood Network case study, we should strive for an approach that
respects both the members’ time and their input, so having a draft set of possible
outcomes and indicators in hand will likely be the prudent approach. By presenting a
“starter dough” set of overarching outcomes for the Corridor—ones that will likely ring
true for everyone (e.g. beginning with a healthy birth, all children ready for school, all
children graduate college and work-force ready) to larger forums and gatherings, people
will begin to experience both the opportunity to help “set the agenda” but also to
experience the feeling of a broader community coming together around a shared set of
goals for the children and families in the neighborhood. In this process, it will be
important that indicators possess a blend of social science validity and de facto
legitimacy on the part of residents. People need to see in the outcomes an expression of
what they care about, what they aspire to, what would define in concrete terms what they
mean by “community.” We will aim to develop a Corridor-wide set of indicators, and
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allow each community to adapt and personalize additional outcomes that reflect their
unique needs. This is increasingly important in the path to results, since too many
nonprofits do not know if they are making an impact (Wallace 2008).
While the residents and service partners in the Corridor are of course a primary
focus of these conversations, it becomes increasingly important at this stage to build
relationships with foundations, individual donors, and city agencies—all of whom are not
only the source of potential resources, but who also influence the outcomes to which
organizations and institutions are held accountable. The highly fragmented funding
patterns within the philanthropic sector, plus their frequent disconnection from actual
results, is a significant reason there is so little return on our civic investments (Goldberg
2009). Dialogues among small groups of funders to discuss such questions as “What
outcomes are we expecting of the groups we fund? How were those determined and how
are they conveyed? Can we align our various expectations and initiatives to dovetail
with the community’s own vision and goals?” will be critical if a new, shared platform is
to be built in the community. Although there is reason to build trust by starting small in
safe environments among funders themselves, as the trust level grows, it will be
important to make sure these conversations are not separate from the community
discussion of its vision.
Act
As we have seen in the research and in the case studies, if people do not quickly
see themselves acting in ways that produce results, they quickly lose faith and interest in
projects and processes. Given the admittedly unconventional and abstract nature of a
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“Children’s Corridor,” that threat is particularly high here. Even more, since much of the
focus, in the end, will be on promoting the importance of shared outcomes for children
and families, the timeline of celebrating “all children graduating ready for college and the
work force” will feel impossibly distant to capture most people’s attention. For this
reason, establishing an action orientation toward not only intermediate outcomes for
children and families (e.g. increases in the number of students reading on grade level is
more immediate than graduation rates) but also toward more immediate, tangible
activities that provide benefit to the community and help model the scale and depth of
commitment to the Corridor approach (e.g. Walk the Block activities, community clean
ups, etc) will pay dividends in both the groups sense of efficacy and the energy and
connection amongst people. And as we learned in all three case studies, creating space
for people to simply become more aware of the many resources in their community
already—through presentations at meetings or through resource fairs and showcases—is
both a way to focus on the assets of the community and to provide more opportunities for
connections amongst resources. As the partners in the rural mental project learned, they
had what they needed all along.
Remembering the challenge of follow through and sustainability that was clear
from the Yosemite Corridor in its absence, and so present in the Early Childhood
network, it is critical to identify, early on and throughout the early stages, the talents and
skills of people in the community who just “get things done.” While they sometimes
come in the form of well-established leaders who everyone relies on, more often they are
the ones behind the scenes making the casseroles, cleaning up after the party, and typing
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up the attendance lists rather than out in front getting noticed. Finding ways to enlist their
natural staying power is of critical importance. The first key is to make sure they are not
driven away in the early stages—there is a likely mismatch between the more abstract,
lofty vision of the Children’s Corridor and the personality styles that are excellent foot
soldiers who follow through on details. Making sure that in the early stages, they see
ways to take on concrete elements of the projects and see to the details will be a
necessary art in the project. The second key will be to identify the kind of infrastructure
and logistics that are necessary but not obvious for the success of the initiative. In the
Yosemite Corridor dialogues, one of the participants was a recent immigrant who spoke
little English but who was eager to get involved. After we held one of the potlucks at his
home, it became quite clear that it was no longer necessary to order food for the forums
from stores or restaurants—he was an excellent cook and very eager to contribute. We
saved 80% on the food bills and increased his buy in to the project and people’s
appreciation for him ten-fold.
While these efforts to achieve interim successes and “quick wins” to keep people
engaged are critical, they do not replace the need for innovations and actions on a much
larger scale to create higher leverage impact. The tools in the Piton’s Children’s Corridor
“tool kit”—visibility, connectivity, leverage, innovation, amplification—are by their
nature self-organizing concepts and patterns found in nature, and therefore excellent
examples of what a COS 3.0 in operation looks like. Just as the brain reinforces
successful connections between neurons in the act of learning, communities can “learn”
by making successful achievements more visible and by amplifying those
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accomplishments as a way to encourage more successful ventures. Leveraging its
previous investments in schools and other institutions will also be key for Piton. As a
case in point, its previous investment in high performing charter schools has helped to
launch a positive climate for innovation within the realm of school reform. Still, these
success stories are often trapped within bureaucratic structures and out of date policies
that are not conducive to innovation. As the community is stymied by such limitations,
Piton can draw upon its previous investments in organizations like the Children’s
Campaign, an effective children’s advocacy organization, to assist in changing the
policies that are preventing the community from achieving its goals. While the
foundation is understandably hesitant to “throw its weight around” for fear of returning to
COS 2.0 where large institutions exercise undue influence, in this example, when the
change is in service of the outcomes identified by the community, then their efforts are
still a form of “bottom up” change in so far as they are assets put in use on behalf of the
community.
Learn
As we saw in the both the research on collaboration and effective organizational
processes (Senge 1990; Garvin, Edmondson and Gino 2008) as well as in the Early
Childhood network, fostering a climate of learning is not only critical for ensuring that
one’s efforts are hitting their mark, it is also essential for ensuring that when external
forces of accountability and threats to the system arise—e.g. reports, press conferences,
crises—that the network is practiced in inquiring into the data rather than running for
cover and blaming others. This means, in part, having good systems for tracking data,
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which we will discuss in a moment, but most of all it means clear processes for learning
and an atmosphere where learning is encouraged. Assuming that the early stages of
inclusion and dialogue will help build that foundation, a critical part of a community’s
embrace of learning is the ritual of public accountability for its shared goals. As an
example, the Jacksonville Community Council Incorporated has been annually reviewing
its set of “civic indicators” for over 25 years to track its progress towards goals, and using
the annual data to help launch the next round of action items and volunteer committees in
the community (Jacksonville Community Council 2009).
Culture of Collaboration: The Civic Network
What I have described so far is an attempt to paint a picture of how the
community learning model might play out on a broad scale throughout the corridor and
help establish the virtuous cycle of inclusion, dialogue, trust, shared commitment,
effective action, and learning over time. But in many ways, it is still heavily dependent
on the inputs of a small group of “early adopters” who bear much of the responsibility for
carrying it forward. What will truly tip the scales, and shift it from an “application” to a
“platform” is to embed these practices both into the norms and practices of the
community as well as into online tools and technology that enable much more rapid
deployment and expansion of ideas and connections. Virtually every member of the
network has both needs and resources that would benefit from deeper connections with
others in the network, but we seldom know how to make those connections happen at the
right scale when we need them. The interaction of people on a social scale helps a great
deal, but is often localized. The web can open up an infinite array of possible
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connections, but is often overwhelming and impersonal. By creating what we are
envisioning as the “civic network,” we would ideally combine the best of both worlds.
The runaway success of platforms like Facebook , You Tube, Google, and Wikipedia are
not just industry leaders in the same way Standard Oil, Chrysler, Mountain Bell, and US
Steel were. The latter were giants in the closed systems of COS 2.0; the former are
platforms in the open world of COS 3.0. They provide a common platform that is
trusted by members and viewed as worthy of their investment of time and resources.
They also provide an open architecture that support the interactions of one’s choosing
and amplify the reach of any one person and enable the interactions to scale up
exponentially. This viral quality is not just useful for sharing funny video clips, but for
alerting neighbors to safety risks, spreading word of upcoming events, and connecting
resources to needs in a much more efficient manner. On top of the basic elements of
connectivity, the civic network would embed the learning community model into a shared
site for the community, enabling all members to find ways to include new members in the
effort, carry on conversations online, spread word of events and activities happening in
the area, share data to monitor progress, and spread the news about lessons learned. It
can serve as a community hub and source of open, scalable connections.
A second feature of online communities that is proving to be extremely helpful in
the way communities learn is the tool of feedback loops. Ratings of resources, services,
even feedback on the quality of commentary of online postings helps regulate the
interactions of community members and establish meaning and order from the chaos of
and noise of the often impersonal internet. Alternative currencies can help build the
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viability of local economies, and networks of volunteerism and exchange of services.
This can be of tremendous advantage in low-income communities and high
unemployment areas. These can also be an example of what Chrislip (2002) speaks of in
terms of building “networks of responsibility” as important aspects of channeling civil
society’s power to promote a stronger democracy and better communities. In the
Children’s Corridor, the civic network would be an ideal way to channel the energy of
existing civic leadership programs, volunteer networks, etc. to help leverage the interest
in serving, with defined community needs, toward agreed upon community outcomes.
By creating the infrastructure to connect, learn, and adapt, the civic network could
assist the Corridor in becoming what researchers are beginning to identify as an “adaptive
learning system:”
These systems engage a large number of organizations working on different
aspects of a single complex issue in an ongoing, facilitated process that
establishes comparative performance metrics, coordinates their efforts, and
enables them to learn from each other. Benefits include improved alignment of
goals among the different organizations, more collaborative problem solving, and
the formation of an ongoing learning community that gradually increases all
participants’ effectiveness. As an example: The Strive initiative includes 300
diverse education-related organizations in the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky
region. These organizations work together across fifteen networks that are
organized by type of intervention, from early childhood education to career
counseling. Each network meets bi-weekly to share information, develop common
outcome measures, and coordinate efforts, creating a comprehensive and systemic
approach to tracking and improving educational outcomes throughout the region.
(Kramer, Parkhurst and Vaidyanathan 2009, 2)
When the Children’s Corridor has this type of infrastructure in place, the capacity
for the community to not only learn as individuals, but truly learn as a community will be
multiplied enormously. In contrast to the view many people have of communities in
decline, such an internal capacity, both in its human relations and in its technological
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connections, would be capable of extraordinary things. If slime mold can self organize to
solve the challenges of rail lines in Japan, the possibilities for what communities of
thoughtful, committed people can do are endless.
Summary
In this chapter I have tried to pull the various threads of the project together and
offer a proposal for the design of a new way to engage communities by raising the civic
canopy and installing a new COS 3.0 that builds on the best of what we know about
effective communication and collaboration, and operates in line with the principles that
undergird the upward spirals of collaborative action that are becoming an alternative
model to our assumptions of conflict and competition within the world of COS 2.0. It is
not intended as a cure all for any conceivable problem, but as a platform on which
commutates can more effectively solve those that do arise.
Concluding Thoughts
In 2000, when the journey of this dissertation began, I sat down with my group of
advisors and explained that I had come to the program to explore in more detail a dream I
had developed while living for a year in what was at the time East and West Germany.
While studying on both sides of the Berlin Wall, I had been confronted in a visceral way
with the collective dysfunction of our larger political systems, how they had divided us in
half, and how, ironically, both sides had discovered certain elements of a solution while
being overwhelmed by different aspects of the problem. On the very soil where Marx
proclaimed the power of the dialectic, it was as if we had drawn the evolution of political
thought to a painful halt, erecting a concrete structure between thesis and antithesis, while
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the world languished in the frigid decades of our halted political discourse. The Wall
seemed to embody in physical form a type of schizophrenia in our underlying collective
patterns of thought.
But if my time on both sides of the Wall drove home the insanity of the world we
lived in at the time, it also revealed the constructed nature of our cultural operating
systems, and that although they seem to be fixed patterns embedded in the natural order
of things, they are ultimately the reflection and consequence of human decisions. It was
there that I was also introduced to Habermas’s “unfinished project of modernity,” and
first developed the hope that if we could reclaim the dialectical spirit of reason—not in
the Marxian form of teleological determinism toward the dictatorship of the proletariat,
but in the name of a more authentic, ongoing dialogue around the problems that confront
our neighborhoods and our nations—then maybe, just maybe, we could combine the
lessons from both sides into a more robust and effective democracy going forward.
The Berlin Wall did of course come down shortly after I left East Germany in
1989—only my mother draws any connection between those two events of course—and I
returned for final year of college, where I first sketched out the idea that I would present
to my advisors at DU and Iliff a decade later when I began the long journey of this
dissertation. In the ten years that elapsed since I first began coursework, the Civic
Canopy came to life in ways I had not expected, with hundreds of different partners
joining together in the exploration of the possibility of what the world might look like if
we intentionally applied some of the principles and practices explored in this paper.
While I had conceived of it in more abstract terms initially, as a way to describe the kind
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of overarching “container” that would stand as a metaphor for an age in which civil
society began to function more like an ecosystem, we ended up adopting at the name of
the non-profit organization which I currently co-direct along with Drew O’Connor. While
there are no doubt some delusions of grandeur in the conception of the civic canopy writ
large, and even more in naming an organization after those visions, should we prove
successful in pursuing some of the plans outlined here, we envision the day when the
members of the civic network would comprise the actual canopy itself. In a very real
way, people comprise and reinforce the systems in which we live, and as Berger’s points
reinforced at the outset, we both shape the systems within which we live and they in turn
shape us. It is our hope that in claiming this audacious space that we might more
intentionally bring this new way of being together into existence, and in so doing, benefit
from the new climate and culture that is brought to life within the collaborative networks
of a new civic canopy.
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APPENDIX A

Contextual factors such as good timing and a clear
need
Inclusiveness
Credibility and openness of process
Commitment and/or involvement of high level,
visible leaders
Support or acquiescence of “established” authorities
or powers
Overcoming mistrust and skepticism
Strong leadership of the process
Interim successes (results)
A shift to broader concerns
Connect citizens to public life
Mobilize social capital to solve community
problems
Facilitate small and large group dialogue
Compare values, consider options
Take action by changing policies, organizations,
and communities
Equalize engagement across all citizens (treat
stakeholders equally)
New programs to address longstanding
neighborhood needs
Temporary planning and decision-making forums
Projects that harness technology
Authenticity—belief that participants can influence
outcomes
Focuses on the problem/clear goal
Process is revisable
Utilizes data to inform decisions
Ongoing cycle of learning
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